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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Genetic privacy and police practices have come to the fore in the 
criminal justice system.  Developing case law1 and stories in the 
media2 document that police are surreptitiously harvesting the 
DNA of putative suspects.3  Some sources indicate that 
surreptitious data banking may also be in its infancy.4  In one 
twist, a sample of DNA from a five-year-old Pap smear of an 
unsuspecting and unsuspected relative of the infamous BTK killer 
in Kansas City contributed to his arrest.5  
Surreptitious DNA harvesting6 by the police is currently 
unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.  The few courts that have 
addressed the issue consistently find that the police are free to 
harvest DNA abandoned by a putative suspect in a public place.7  
Little in the nascent surreptitious–harvesting case law suggests 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 351–52 (Mass. 2007) (discussing 
methods employed by Boston police to obtain suspect’s DNA); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 
31 (Wash. 2007) (explaining ruse invented by Seattle Police Department to collect 
defendant’s DNA); State v. Christian, No. 04-0900, 2006 WL 2419031, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 
Aug. 23, 2006) (describing subterfuge employed by Iowa City police to collect suspect’s 
DNA).  
 2 See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Lawyers Fight DNA Samples Gained on Sly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
3, 2008, at A1 (describing differing opinions on the legality of surreptitiously collected DNA 
samples). 
 3 A “putative suspect” is one whom the police suspect of having committed a crime but 
for whom the police do not have sufficient evidence to meet the probable-cause standard for 
a search warrant to get a sample of the suspect’s blood or saliva for DNA analysis.   
 4 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Grand, The Blooding of America: Privacy and the DNA Dragnet, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2277, 2280 (2002) (noting that law enforcement agencies may be creating 
massive database of DNA profiles); Richard Willing, Local DNA Labs Avoid State and U.S. 
Limits: Databases Nab Criminals, but Legality in Question, USA TODAY, Mar. 26, 2007, at 
1A (“A growing number of police crime labs are adding DNA from suspects to 
databases . . . .”); Tom Precious, Crime Lab Lambasted over DNA Database; Policies 
Defended as Needed Both To Solve and Prevent Crimes, BUFFALO NEWS, May 21, 2006, at 
A1 (explaining county’s policy concerning expansion of state’s collection of genetic 
information). 
 5 Ellen Nakashima, From DNA of Family, a Tool to Make Arrests: Privacy Advocates Say 
the Emerging Practice Turns Relatives into Genetic Informants, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2008, 
at A01. 
 6 The term “surreptitious harvesting” is used in this Article instead of the term 
“surreptitious sampling.”  It is a term that more comprehensively captures the police 
conduct at issue. 
 7 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1. 
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that surreptitious data banking would be regulated under current 
judicial conceptions of the Fourth Amendment.   
Interestingly, some evidence exists that surreptitious DNA 
harvesting is also happening in the noncriminal context.  
Apparently, some amateur genealogists have made surreptitious 
efforts to get DNA from a putative relative for ancestry or kinship 
testing.8  In one circumstance, a high-profile celebrity divorce, a 
private investigator was able to obtain dental floss for DNA 
paternity analysis from the garbage of the putative father.9 
Even in its infant stages, DNA harvesting by private parties is 
regulated.  In the cases of the amateur genealogist and the private 
investigator, it is very possible that such conduct falls within the 
prohibitions of a genetic-privacy statute in some jurisdictions.10  If 
so, the genetic-privacy intruder may be liable for damages in a 
private cause of action.11  
If a private party targeted a putative suspect as a potential 
research subject rather than a subject of a police investigation, the 
law applicable to human-subject research would raise a host of 
barriers.12  The legal and ethical prohibition against obtaining 
research samples of any kind from a putative subject without that 
subject’s informed consent is one of the foundational principles of 
modern human-subject research.13 
So why does the law regard genetic privacy issues in criminal 
and civil contexts differently?  Why do surreptitious-DNA-
harvesting practices by private parties get appreciably more legal 
scrutiny than such practices by police?   One broad-brush answer 
                                                                                                                   
 8 Amy Harmon, Stalking Strangers’ DNA To Fill in the Family Tree, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 
2007, at A1. 
 9 David M. Halbfinger & Allison Hope Weiner, Celebrity Lawyer in Talks About 
Wiretapping Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at B7.  
 10 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-21-1 to -6 (West 2012) (generally prohibiting use of 
genetic information without informal and written consent).  See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, 
DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and Testing, 91 
B.U.L. REV. 665 (2011) (arguing for the criminalization of private-party theft of another’s 
DNA). 
 11 § 24-21-6(B). 
 12 See generally CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH 
WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (2005) (explaining human-subject research law). 
 13 Id. 
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is that society places more value on the public-safety goal of 
solving crimes than on the needs of amateur genealogists, divorce 
lawyers, and genetic researchers.  That broad-brush answer is 
unsatisfactory.   
Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on surreptitious 
harvesting creates an all-or-nothing dynamic.  If a putative 
suspect—one for whom the police have some reasonable suspicion 
but not enough for a search warrant—abandons his DNA in a 
public place, the police can do with the sample what they will, 
without limitation.  The police can do the same for a suspect for 
whom they have only a hunch.  They can also do the same for 
someone for whom they have no suspicion, including a victim or a 
witness. They can do so without a suspect’s, a witness’s, or a 
victim’s consent or knowledge.  If surreptitious DNA harvesting is 
not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, the police can do 
whatever they want with anyone’s DNA. 
The thrust of this Article is that this all-or-nothing dynamic of 
DNA-harvesting jurisprudence is an understandable but 
misguided judicial response to the immediate benefits of a new 
technology.  This Article proposes that police may seize abandoned 
property containing human cells, which include DNA, without a 
warrant or probable cause; but, the police need a search warrant 
supported by probable cause to mine those cells for any genetic 
information.   
Part I reviews the current state of forensic DNA technology as 
it relates to surreptitious harvesting.  Part II reviews existing 
surreptitious-harvesting case law and the debate about 
surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA among commentators.  
Part III frames the surreptitious-harvesting circumstance within 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and identifies three fallacies 
that accompany current perspectives.  Part IV posits a model of an 
expectation of genetic privacy—a kaleidoscope of identity—that 
accounts for its physical, informational, and dignitary dimensions.  
Part V evaluates whether such an expectation of genetic privacy is 
one that society recognizes as reasonable.  It examines the use of 
DNA metaphors in popular news accounts through the prism of 
linguistic theory to conclude that society recognizes DNA as a 
450 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 47:445 
 
 
source of core identity.  Part VI concludes that a careful, 
interdisciplinary analysis of surreptitious DNA harvesting within 
the context of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence militates 
against an all-or-nothing dynamic and in favor of a requirement 
that police get a search warrant supported by probable cause to 
mine an abandoned item for DNA. 
II.  THE TECHNOLOGY  
Twenty-five years ago, the police did not have the investigative 
techniques at their disposal to engage in surreptitious DNA 
analysis.  U.S. commercial laboratories began using forensic DNA 
analysis for investigative purposes in 1986.14  The FBI began using 
DNA analysis in casework in 1988.15  Today, over one hundred 
fifty public laboratories are available for forensic DNA testing in 
the United States.16 
Prior to the advent of forensic DNA technology, fingerprints and 
blood typing were the primary forensic identification tools.17  
However, fingerprints were found only at crime scenes where the 
perpetrator handled an item, and blood typing was of limited 
discriminatory value.18  Forensic DNA analysis has reduced many 
of these limitations because DNA exists in any human cell with a 
nucleus.19  Biological samples sufficient for use in DNA analysis 
can exist, for example, in bloodstains,20 semen stains,21 bones,22 
teeth,23 hair,24 saliva,25 urine,26 feces,27 fingernail debris,28 muscle 
                                                                                                                   
 14 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 28 (1992). 
 15 Id. 
 16 JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF 
STR MARKERS 3 (2d ed. 2005). 
 17 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 27–29. 
 18 BUTLER, supra note 16, at 5.  
 19 Id. at 33. 
 20 Bruce Budowle et al., Simple Protocols for Typing Forensic Biological Evidence: 
Chemiluminescent Detection for Human DNA Quantitation and Restriction Fragment 
Length Polymorphism (RFLP) Analyses and Manual Typing of Polymerase Chain Reaction 
(PCR) Amplified Polymorphisms, 16 ELETROPHORESIS 1559, 1560 (1995). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Peter Gill et al., Identification of the Remains of the Romanov Family by DNA Analysis, 
6 NATURE GENETICS 130, 130 (1994). 
 23 A. Alvarez Garcia et al., Effect of Environmental Factors on PCR–DNA Analysis from 
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tissue,29 cigarette butts,30 postage stamps,31 dandruff,32 and, 
ironically, fingerprints.33   
Because a human cell and its nucleus can survive departure 
from the body itself, transfers of DNA from one place to another 
can occur frequently, be it from suspect to victim, victim to 
suspect, suspect or victim to an object or location.34  Given 
advances in technology, the robustness of the sample is becoming 
less and less important.  A forensic scientist can now extract DNA 
from a sample that is not visible to the human eye.35   
The availability of out-of-body DNA for forensic analysis has  
greatly expanded the investigative options of the police.   For 
example, crime-scene, out-of-body DNA has led to convictions in 
previously unsolved crimes.36  In some instances, it has led to the 
                                                                                                                   
Dental Pulp, 109 INT’L J. LEGAL MED. 125, 125 (1996). 
 24 Russell Higuchi et al., DNA Typing from Single Hairs, 332 NATURE 543, 543 (1988); 
M.R. Wilson et al., Extraction, PCR Amplification and Sequencing of Mitochondrial DNA 
from Human Hair Shafts, 18 BIOTECHNIQUES, 662, 662 (1995). 
 25 David Sweet  & Gary G. Shutler, Analysis of Salivary DNA Evidence from a Bite Mark 
on a Body Submerged in Water, 44 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1069, 1069 (1999). 
 26 Toshihiro Yasuda et al., A Simple Method of DNA Extraction and STR Typing from 
Urine Samples Using a Commercially Available DNA/RNA Extraction Kit, 48 J. FORENSIC 
SCI. 108, 108 (2003). 
 27 Andrew J. Hopwood et al., DNA Typing from Human Faeces, 108 INT’L J. LEGAL MED. 
237, 237 (1996). 
 28 P. Wiegand et al., DNA Typing of Debris from Fingernails, 106 INT’L J. LEGAL MED. 81, 
81 (1993). 
 29 Manfred N. Hochmeister, PCR Analysis of DNA from Fresh and Decomposed Bodies 
and Skeletal Remains in Medicolegal Death Investigations, 98 METHODS OF MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY 19, 19 (1998). 
 30 Manfred N. Hochmeister et al., PCR-Based Typing of DNA Extracted from Cigarette 
Butts, 104 INT’L J. LEGAL MED. 229, 229 (1991). 
 31 B. Hopkins et al., The Use of Minisatellite Variant Repeat–Polymerase Chain Reaction 
(MVR–PCR) to Determine the Source of Saliva on a Used Postage Stamp, 39 J. FORENSIC 
SCI. 526, 526 (1994). 
 32 Birgit Herber & Kurt Herold, DNA Typing of Human Dandruff, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 
648, 648 (1998). 
 33 Roland A.H. van Oorschot & Maxwell K. Jones, DNA Fingerprints from Fingerprints, 
387 NATURE 767, 767 (1997). 
 34 H.C. Lee et al., Guidelines for the Collection and Preservation of DNA Evidence, 41 J. 
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 344 (1991).  
 35 BUTLER, supra note 16, at 35. 
 36 See, e.g., State v. Whittey, 821 A.2d 1086, 1089 (N.H. 2003) (affirming conviction for 
murder supported by DNA analysis of crime-scene semen frozen for eighteen years). 
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exoneration of wrongfully convicted inmates, some of whom had 
served five, ten, or twenty years in jail.37   
It has also led to the collection of DNA from one whom the 
police think may have committed a crime but for whom they do not 
have probable cause for a search warrant to get a DNA sample.  
Whether one calls this technique the collection of abandoned or 
shed DNA,38 DNA harvesting, or covert involuntary sampling,39 
the police are beginning to use the technique more frequently.40   
Sometimes, the police follow a person of interest and collect a 
discarded item that may contain sufficient cells for DNA 
analysis.41  Sometimes, the police lure a person of interest to the 
police station for a noncustodial interview and offer that person a 
cigarette or a soda.42 Sometimes, the police have been even more 
creative, as in State v. Athan.43  There, the police had renewed 
their investigation of Athan, a possible suspect in a twenty-year-
old homicide.  They sent a letter to Athan, who was living out of 
state, posing as a fictitious law firm asking him to join an equally 
fictitious class action lawsuit concerning parking tickets.  Athan 
signed the enclosed class action authorization form and mailed it 
back.  The forensic laboratory obtained a sample of Athan’s DNA 
from saliva on the envelope flap.  Athan was subsequently 
convicted.44 
                                                                                                                   
 37 See generally INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org. 
 38 D.H. Kaye, Science Fiction and Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 62, 62 
(2006). 
 39 Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic 
Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 882 (2006). 
 40 See generally State v. Christian, No. 04-0900, 2006 WL 2419031 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 
23, 2006); Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341 (Mass. 2007); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27 
(Wash. 2007). 
 41 See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 2 (describing how police followed suspect and obtained 
DNA from discarded cigarette butt). 
 42 See, e.g., Chastain, 2006 WL 2419031, at *1 (collecting DNA from water bottle offered 
to suspect during an apparent volunteer-position interview). 
 43 158 P.3d at 31–32. 
 44 Id.  
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III.  THE COMMENTATORS AND THE CASES 
Commentators have evaluated the harvesting of out-of-body 
DNA from putative suspects in light of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  One, Elizabeth Joh, has rejected the 
appropriateness of a Fourth Amendment abandoned-property or 
“trash” analogy to this circumstance and has stated that “the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections appear to fall short of providing a 
constitutional basis from which to challenge abandoned DNA 
collection.”45  She also evaluated other possible analogies—
fingerprints, body parts, and human waste—and found these 
interpretive mechanisms wanting for “what is important about 
genetic information.”46  She has suggested that the deficiencies in 
these various analogies “make the case for ‘genetic exceptionalism’: 
that DNA is a unique category, incapable of abandonment (and 
perhaps of sale or patent), and warranting its own analysis 
without reference to other body parts or to trash.”47 
Another commentator, David Kaye, has concluded that the 
fingerprint analogy is the correct analogy; courts should not be 
distracted by the occasional deception involved in harvesting out-
of-body DNA—to do otherwise “would be to indulge in ‘genetics 
exceptionalism.’ ”48  He has focused particular attention on the 
merit of the fingerprint analogy, closely debating with another 
commentator whether information gathered at the genetic 
locations used in STR DNA analysis can tell us something about 
an individual beyond nametag information.49   
Both Kaye and Joh use the abandonment theory and the Katz v. 
United States50 reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in their 
analyses.  Both conclude that current Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                   
 45 Joh, supra note 39, at 868. 
 46 Id. at 868–69. 
 47 Id. at 869. 
 48 David H. Kaye, The Science of DNA Identification: From The Laboratory to the 
Courtroom (and Beyond), 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 409, 420 (2007). 
 49 Kaye, supra note 38, at 66; Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54, 54 (2007).  See generally David H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the 
Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 70 (2007) (responding to Cole).  
 50 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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jurisprudence likely does not provide a putative suspect 
Constitutional protection from surreptitious harvesting of out-of-
body DNA.  Joh argues that the putative suspect should have such 
protection because DNA is different; thus, traditional Fourth 
Amendment analogies—fingerprints, for example—are not 
appropriate.51  Kaye argues the putative suspect should not have 
constitutional protection because a DNA nametag is not different 
enough from a fingerprint for Fourth Amendment purposes.52  
Courts have uniformly rejected Fourth Amendment protection 
against surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA by the police.  
By and large, they have found (1) that the putative suspect 
abandoned the item upon or in which the DNA-laden cells were 
found and (2) as a result, there was no expectation of privacy in 
the item or that which it was in or on.  By focusing on the putative 
suspect’s privacy in the discarded item, virtually no court has 
explicitly considered either the person’s privacy rights in the DNA 
itself or the nature and extent of those genetic-privacy rights. 
One of the lengthier opinions on the Fourth Amendment 
implications of surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA is 
People v. Sigsbee.53  In 1975, the police had some evidence, shy of 
probable cause, to suspect that Donald Sigsbee had murdered a 
woman found in a remote landfill area.  However, forensic DNA 
testing did not exist at the time.  Twenty-eight years later, in 
2003, the police began a loose surveillance of Sigsbee.54  One 
investigator followed Sigsbee to a Wendy’s restaurant and watched 
him eat his meal and drink a root beer through a straw.55  When 
Sigsbee left the Wendy’s, the investigator retrieved the cup and 
straw from the trash and submitted it for forensic DNA testing.56 
                                                                                                                   
 51 Joh, supra note 39, at 882–83. 
 52 Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 
WASH. L. REV. 413, 436–40 (2001).  Ironically, Kaye suggests, at the least, that an analysis 
using abandonment theory, which says that individuals have abandoned any Fourth 
Amendment protection in their DNA when they abandons it in public, is a closer call than 
Joh seems to suggest.   
 53 No. 03-0342, slip op. (Onondaga, N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Oct. 30, 2003). 
 54 Id. at 8. 
 55 Id. at 9. 
 56 Id. at 9–10. 
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The trial court denied Sigsbee’s motion to suppress the straw 
and the DNA test results from the straw based on a Fourth 
Amendment violation.57  It held that Sigsbee had abandoned any 
Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his DNA on the straw 
when he abandoned the straw: 
[W]hen the defendant discarded the straw he also 
discarded any expectation of privacy in the DNA 
evidence on the straw.  While it is unlikely that the 
defendant believed that he was discarding bodily fluids 
that would show his DNA profile, nonetheless, by 
discarding the cup and straw into the trash receptacle, 
he relinquished any expectation of privacy concerning 
those items themselves or any bodily fluids contained 
on them. . . .  The scientific analysis of the straw does 
not involve any further search and seizure of the 
defendant’s person or property and does not, therefore, 
involve any violation of the defendant’s constitutional 
rights to be free from unlawful searches and seizures.58 
Other courts have taken a similar approach.  In Commonwealth 
v. Cabral, the court found that the defendant had voluntarily 
abandoned the reasonable expectation of privacy he had in his 
saliva when he “expectorated” on a public street.59  With his 
expectoration, “he assumed the risk of the public witnessing his 
action and thereafter taking possession of his bodily fluids.”60  In 
                                                                                                                   
 57 Id. at 28. 
 58 Id. at 31–32.  The Sigsbee court also made an effort to analyze the possibility of Sigsbee 
having an expectation of privacy in his bodily fluids: 
Unlike escaping heat from one’s home, the voluntary discarding of a cup 
and straw in a public restaurant involved a conscious and intentional act 
which affirmatively demonstrated the relinquishment of any expectation of 
privacy that one may have had in those items.  The loss of heat from one’s 
home, for the most part, does not constitute a conscious, intentional or 
voluntary act of the owner of the home. 
Id. at 32.  The court then went on to reject more directly any theory that Sigsbee had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his bodily fluids. 
 59 Commonwealth v. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d 429, 433 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
 60 Id. 
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Commonwealth v. Bly, the defendant left the police station after 
an interview, leaving a water bottle and cigarette butts.61  The 
court never reached the abandonment issue identified by the 
Sigsbee trial court.  Instead, it grounded its decision on the 
defendant’s “wholesale failure to manifest any expectation of 
privacy in the items whatsoever.”62  Even in a case where the court 
suppressed the surreptitiously seized out-of-body DNA, State v. 
Reed, its analysis reflected a pure abandonment approach.63  The 
court found that Reed had not abandoned the cigarette butt he had 
flicked onto his own patio in the back of his apartment, an area in 
which he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.64 
In State v. Christian, an undercover officer sat in on an 
interview that Christian had with a city agency.65  During the 
interview, the officer provided Christian with two water bottles 
from which he drank and the interviewer provided him with a 
piece of cake accompanied by a fork.66  When Christian left, he 
took the magazine he had brought with him and the interview 
paperwork but not the fork or water bottles.67  The court found 
that Christian had abandoned the water bottle and fork when he 
did not take them with him and thus had no expectation of privacy 
in them.68  
Unlike the Sigsbee, Cabral and Bly courts, however, the 
Christian court hinted at the possibility of a deeper, DNA-focused 
privacy analysis when it said, “[i]n the absence of any definitive 
authority to the contrary, we are unable to say Christian had a 
subjective or objective expectation of privacy in the DNA shed on 
the items seized.”69  The court went on to note that it would have 
                                                                                                                   
 61 Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 349 n.3 (Mass. 2007). 
 62 Id. at 357. 
 63 State v. Reed, 641 S.E.2d 320, 321–23 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
 64 Id. 
 65 No. 04-0900, 2006 WL 2419031, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at *4. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.  
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found that Christian had abandoned any such expectation, even if 
it did exist.70 
In State v. Athan, the police obtained DNA from saliva on the 
flap of an envelope Athan had licked before he sent it unwittingly 
to the police as a part of an elaborate ruse.71  The defendant 
asserted that he had a privacy interest in his body and bodily 
functions, including his saliva.72  The court found that under the 
circumstances Athan had “no inherent privacy interest in saliva.”73  
The court noted that the saliva was not taken as part of an 
invasive procedure as in pre-employment urinalysis testing 
programs.74  It found that Athan had abandoned his saliva when 
he licked the envelope and then mailed it, a circumstance similar 
to that of “a person spitting on the sidewalk or leaving a cigarette 
butt in an ashtray.”75  The envelope effectively became the 
property of the police.76   
Interestingly, the ACLU, as amicus curiae, also argued on 
Athan’s behalf that DNA “has the potential to reveal a vast 
amount of personal information, including medical conditions and 
familial relations,” and thus Athan should have a privacy 
interest.77  The court disagreed: 
While this may be true in some circumstances, the 
State’s use of Athan’s DNA here was narrowly limited 
to identification purposes.  What was done with the 
letter, including DNA testing for the limited purpose of 
identification, was not within the sender’s control.  The 
concerns raised by the ACLU, while valid, are not 
present in this case.  The State used the sample for 
                                                                                                                   
 70 Id. 
 71 158 P.3d 27, 32 (Wash. 2007).  See supra note 44 and accompanying text for a more 
detailed description of the elaborate ruse. 
 72 Athan, 158 P.3d at 33. 
 73 Id. at 33–34. 
 74 Id. at 33. 
 75 Id. at 34. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
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identification purposes only, not for purposes that 
raise the concerns advanced by the ACLU.78 
Overall, those courts that have analyzed the Fourth 
Amendment consequences of surreptitious harvesting of out-of-
body DNA by the police have used a very narrow focus for their 
analysis.  Technically, the intrusion-on-property analyses were not 
Olmstead-like; each court that focused on the item upon or within 
which the DNA was found articulated the magic words of Katz’s 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.79  But the courts’ 
abandonment analysis—an exclusively intrusion-on-property 
focus—was completely dispositive.  So too with the two courts—
Sigsbee and Athan—that applied an intrusion-on-place analysis 
(the body in these cases) used a very narrow approach, focusing on 
the lack of intrusion into the body and articulating the magic 
words of Katz.   Further, the only court to conduct an intrusion-on-
information analysis—Athan—also focused its analysis quite 
narrowly, evaluating only the information actually sought and 
obtained by the police rather than all the information potentially 
available. 
The narrowness of the courts’ analyses in surreptitious-
harvesting cases reflects a misguided focus borne of a 
misapplication of Katz.  Each court that conducted an intrusion-
on-property analysis asked whether the defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the discarded items.  Almost 
without exception,80 no court asked whether the defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his out-of-body DNA or in the 
DNA-laden cells.  Just as the appropriate question in Katz was 
whether Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy in certain 
private communications by phone, so too in the surreptitious-
harvesting cases, the appropriate question is whether the 
defendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their out-of-
                                                                                                                   
 78 Id. 
 79 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (establishing reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test for Fourth Amendment questions). 
 80 The Athan and Sigsbee courts briefly asked versions of the question and concluded in 
the negative without any substantial analysis.  Athan, 158 P.3d at 33; People v. Sigsbee, 
No. 03-0342, slip op. at 31–33 (Onondaga, N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Oct. 30, 2003). 
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body DNA and whatever the personal sense of privacy attached to 
that DNA might be. 
Neither courts nor commentators have fully developed the 
Fourth Amendment analysis applicable to surreptitious harvesting 
of out-of-body DNA by the police.  Much of the discussion to date 
has focused on the abandonment and fingerprint analogies.  Those 
analogies conceive of genetic privacy through the prism of a 
property, a physical-location (most often, the body), or an 
information paradigm.  In the property paradigm, out-of-body 
DNA is no longer part of its owner because it has been abandoned 
and thus is up for grabs.  In the physical-location paradigm, either 
the DNA is no longer part of the body or the police did not 
physically intrude into the body, or both.  In the information 
paradigm, the police are gathering no more intrusive a body of 
data than they would if they had gathered fingerprints—
information that is relatively nonintrusive and one-dimensional.  
Under these analytical paradigms, courts have found no Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred when out-of-body DNA is harvested 
surreptitiously, and commentators have conceded that those 
analyses will likely continue to carry the day.81   
IV.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: BEYOND PROPERTY  
A.  KATZ, KYLLO, AND JONES 
The nature and scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against an intrusion on genetic privacy is not readily apparent 
from the text. It guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”82  
The prohibition reads like one against intrusions on an 
individual’s physical privacy by the government—be it real 
                                                                                                                   
 81 Kaye, supra note 48, at 420.  Joh suggests that DNA is different and argues that the 
idea of genetic exceptionalism suggests that we should be more cautious in using pre-
existing analogies to capture the full import of a new technology.  Joh, supra note 39, at 
873–74. 
 82 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
460 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 47:445 
 
 
property, bodily integrity, other physical items—and makes no 
explicit mention of more intangible conceptions of privacy.  
The Fourth Amendment also says nothing about security from 
intrusions into out-of-body DNA left in a public place, just as it 
says nothing about intrusions involving a host of other modern 
technologies like a GPS,83 public surveillance cameras, or various 
kinds of technological eavesdropping.  Each involves a type of 
technology that the Framers had not contemplated.  Each intrudes 
on more than purely property- or place-based privacy. 
Historically, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence reflected a relatively narrow and somewhat rigid, 
legalistic focus on property and place in defining the extent of 
Fourth Amendment privacy.84  Without a physical invasion, or a 
search of a person, papers, or tangible material effects, no Fourth 
Amendment violation occurs.85  In this conception, privacy “was 
tied very closely to notions of property rights.”86  
In 1967, the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States,87 
abandoned the property and place paradigms as the exclusive 
analytical models for determining when an intrusion on Fourth 
Amendment privacy has occurred.  Katz had made several 
telephone calls from inside a public telephone booth.  Because the 
government suspected Katz of engaging in illegal gambling 
activities, it affixed a listening and recording device to the outside 
of the booth to record Katz’s end of the conversations.88  As a result 
of the evidence gathered from eavesdropping on his conversations, 
Katz was convicted of illegal gambling activities.89  The police had 
not intruded on Katz’s sense of privacy in his property or in a place 
that was his, as they never entered the booth. 
                                                                                                                   
 83 Global Positioning System. 
 84 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (“The Amendment itself 
shows that the search is to be of material things—the person, the house, his papers or his 
effects.”). 
 85 Id. at 466. 
 86 Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to 
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1308–09 (2002). 
 87 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 88 Id. at 348, 354. 
 89 Id. at 348. 
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In its decision, the Court redefined its approach to Fourth 
Amendment privacy in two ways.  It shifted the inquiry to a direct 
focus on the privacy of the person and away from the narrow, 
technical legal status of the property or place searched.   It also 
expansively defined how to measure the privacy at stake: 
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.  What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection. . . .  But what he 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.90 
Thus, Katz could have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest into 
which the government may not intrude, even if that interest exists 
in a public place in which, prior to Katz, a court would have found 
no privacy interest.   
The “people, not places” language meant that Katz’s Fourth 
Amendment privacy interest was a much more intangible one than 
that residing in the space within the phone booth.  It resided in 
Katz’s attitude towards the phone conversation and its content.  
Katz’s conduct in choosing a phone booth and in closing its door 
showed that he wanted to have a private conversation, not simply 
a private space.  Katz sought to keep private the content of his 
phone conversation by his behavior.  His behavior and the 
information he sought to keep secure told the Court the most 
about Katz’s sense of privacy.  The Court did not, however, stop 
with this substantial shift. 
The advantage of the more technical, property-based approach 
had been the well-bounded, albeit legalistic, nature of its 
conception of privacy.  The legal status of the searched item or 
place told all.  It completely defined the nature and extent of the 
privacy interest.  The shift in focus to a more intangible, personal 
privacy conception left open the difficult question of how to 
measure the nature and scope of person-based privacy.  Katz 
                                                                                                                   
 90 Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted). 
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provided an answer, though not a well-bounded one.  Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence described how to assess the nature and scope 
of any possible Fourth Amendment privacy interest a person 
might hold: “there is a twofold requirement, first that a person 
[has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”91   
Justice Harlan’s “two-fold requirement” for measuring whether 
the privacy interest at stake warrants Fourth Amendment 
protection—the Katz test—expanded the privacy inquiry.  Most 
dramatically, it meant that courts would have to articulate the 
expectation of privacy a person might have in the circumstances of 
the case and to measure society’s attitude towards that person’s 
expectation.    
The Court offered little guidance about how to go about this 
process other than solving the case in front of it.  A single 
ungrounded, generalized statement about “the vital role that the 
public telephone has come to play in private communication” 
captures the Court’s methodology for assessing society’s attitude 
towards Katz’s expectation.92  Thus, post-Katz, the two-pronged 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test seems to exist as an 
unbounded, ad hoc assessment by a court of society’s attitude 
toward the privacy interest at issue.    
The legacy of post-Katz courts regarding the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been decidedly mixed, according to 
commentators.93  For example, Orin Kerr has contended that many 
courts simply continued with some form of a property-based 
approach to determining the scope of Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                   
 91 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 92 Id. at 352. 
 93 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 823–24 (2004) (noting that very 
little has changed since Katz); Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The 
Supreme Court, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 20–36 (2002) 
(concluding that Katz is a failure if its original purpose was to regulate modern surveillance 
technologies with Fourth Amendment standards); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ 
Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 1325, 1343–62 (2002) (noting how post-Katz decisions have taken advantage of Katz’s 
failure to provide any real guidance on determining privacy values). 
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privacy.94  Whatever the nature of the legacy, in 2001, in Kyllo v. 
United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the core approach of 
Katz.95 
The police suspected that Kyllo was growing marijuana in his 
house using high-intensity lamps that produced large amounts of 
heat.  Rather than obtain a search warrant, they used a thermal 
imaging device to measure the amount of heat emanating from 
Kyllo’s house.96  The device did not “enter” Kyllo’s house to 
measure the amount of heat; it measured it only after the heat left 
the house.97  The Court again rejected a pure property-based 
analysis.  It found that the use of the thermal imaging device 
constituted the kind of intrusion prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment even though the police never entered Kyllo’s home.98   
The majority relied heavily on factors like information (the 
potential for acquiring intimate details), location (from within the 
home), and the language of the Constitution (the use of the term 
“houses” in the Fourth Amendment) to measure the scope of the 
personal privacy right.  To be sure, the opinion is heavily 
influenced by the property perspective; it goes so far as to say that 
“[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, 
because the entire area is held safe from prying government 
eyes.”99   
But a pure property analysis would have resulted in a different 
outcome because the police never trespassed into Kyllo’s home.  
For the Kyllo majority, home-based intimacy—a personal-privacy 
term—deserves Fourth Amendment protection, even for heat 
outside the home.100  
Most recently, in United States v. Jones, the Court reaffirmed 
its commitment to a beyond-just-property analysis.101  The police 
had placed a GPS device on the underside of a car driven by Jones 
                                                                                                                   
 94 Kerr, supra note 93, at 823–27.  
 95 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 96 Id. at 29. 
 97 Id. at 30. 
 98 Id. at 40. 
 99 Id. at 37.  
 100 Id. at 38. 
 101 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012). 
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and monitored his public whereabouts for four weeks.102  In a set of 
three opinions, all nine members of the Court recognized that, 
whether one had to do a property analysis at all, it was only the 
start of an analysis that included the Katz test.  In fact, five 
members of the Court did or would have found that Jones had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy that society would recognize as 
reasonable in his aggregated public whereabouts over the course of 
four weeks.103 
The Katz test thus provides some insight into the framework of 
an analysis of the nature and scope of the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against the police practice of surreptitious harvesting of 
out-of-body DNA.  One must ask whether the person whose out-of-
body DNA was harvested had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in that DNA.  The property status of that DNA is only one 
factor.104  The location of the DNA, the information which that 
DNA may contain, as well as the individual’s attitude towards that 
DNA and its contents might be informative.  One must then ask if 
that is an expectation that society is willing to recognize as 
reasonable.  The core question, in its simplest terms, is whether 
the individual and society expect privacy in DNA—whether we 
expect our DNA to be secure from government intrusion.   
If one considers the locus of analysis in surreptitious-harvesting 
cases to be one’s personal sense of genetic privacy rather than only 
one’s sense of DNA as property, a subtle but powerful analytical 
shift occurs.  The abandonment question then hinges on the 
knowledge of and intention to abandon that privacy.  The existence 
of one’s DNA outside of one’s body and in public is not an 
automatic Fourth Amendment disqualifier.  And the limited use by 
                                                                                                                   
 102 Id. at 948. 
 103 Justice Sotomayor found that such an expectation would exist if that issue had needed 
to be reached.  Id. at 956.  Justices Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg and Kagan found that one did 
exist.  Id. at 964. 
 104 One commentator on surreptitious DNA harvesting by the police has concluded that, 
“because it is grounded in physical boundaries, the Fourth Amendment fails to protect 
genetic privacy adequately.”  Joh, supra note 39, at 866.  Joh does briefly question whether 
abandoned DNA is really abandoned. Id. at 867.  She also acknowledges that Katz formally 
rejected a property analysis and recognizes the lack of clarity in Fourth Amendment 
protection for abandoned DNA even under a property perspective.  Id. 
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the police of the information contained in that DNA does not 
resolve the expectation question.  In each instance, the shift from a 
narrow to more expansive focus suggests the possibility of a 
different result in surreptitious-harvesting cases. 
B.  THE  ABANDONMENT FALLACY 
In the property or abandonment context, the Katz question 
changes from whether individuals abandoned their saliva, 
cigarette butt, or water bottle, to whether they abandoned their 
expectation of genetic privacy in their DNA.  As one court has 
phrased it: 
 The distinction between abandonment in the 
property-law sense and abandonment in the 
constitutional sense is critical to a proper analysis of 
the issue.  In the law of property, the question, as 
defendant correctly states, is whether the owner has 
voluntarily, intentionally, and unconditionally 
relinquished his interest in the property so that 
another, having acquired possession, may successfully 
assert his superior interest.  In the law of search and 
seizure, however, the question is whether the 
defendant has, in discarding the property, 
relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy so 
that its seizure and search is reasonable within the 
limits of the Fourth Amendment.  In essence, what is 
abandoned is not necessarily the defendant’s property, 
but his reasonable expectation of privacy therein.105 
The significance of this shift is immediately apparent.  
Abandonment requires knowledge and intention.106  Without a 
showing that individuals knew that by their conduct they had 
abandoned their expectation of genetic privacy in their DNA, no 
                                                                                                                   
 105 City of St. Paul v. Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365, 370–71 (Minn. 1975) (footnote omitted) 
(citations omitted).  
 106 Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of Search and Seizure: An 
Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 399, 401–02 (1971). 
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abandonment has occurred.  The Katz Court itself explicitly 
recognized this proposition when it pointed out that “[w]hat a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”107 
Some of the classic Fourth Amendment abandonment 
circumstances involve variations on the theme of the defendant 
seeing the police and either discarding drugs108 or some other 
item109 or walking away from that item.110  In these kinds of cases, 
courts may debate whether the defendant’s acts, words, or other 
objective facts, reflect an intention to abandon or not; but, all of 
them require some manifestation of intention.111  So, in Sigsbee, 
Cabral, Bly et al. ample evidence existed that those putative 
suspects knew and intended to abandon the straw, water bottle, 
saliva, etc. at issue.112 
No evidence exists suggesting any of those putative suspects 
knew they were abandoning whatever expectation of genetic 
privacy they had in their DNA when they went out in public.   It is 
speculative, at best, to conclude from a silent record that 
individuals would know that they were shedding DNA;113 that they 
were aware of the ability of the government to collect that DNA, 
analyze it, and use it as an identification tool; or that they were 
cognizant of the other kinds of uses the police could make of their 
DNA, let alone the scope and breadth of genetic information about 
them that might be available to those with access to it via the 
appropriate technology. 
Courts’ treatment of other privacy-in-public cases supports this 
type of analysis.  The Katz garbage cases consider the extent of the 
                                                                                                                   
 107 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 108 State v. Britton, 633 So. 2d 1208, 1209 (La. 1994) (hiding packet of cocaine in gum 
rack); State v. Crandall, 136 P.3d 30, 31 (Or. 2006) (hiding baggie underneath car). 
 109 United States v. Collis, 766 F.2d 219, 220 (6th Cir. 1985) (abandoning airplane luggage 
after seeing DEA agents). 
 110 United States v. Tugwell, 125 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1997) (walking away from 
suitcase at bus station after drug-sniffing dog alerts to it). 
 111 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983) (“[A]n 
expectation of privacy is a question of intent.”). 
 112 See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
 113 Note that the burden of proof in such circumstances is on the prosecution to justify 
their warrantless conduct.  Mascolo, supra note 106, at 403–04. 
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likely knowledge attributable to the “owner” of the garbage.  In 
California v. Greenwood,114 the Supreme Court found that “[i]t is 
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side 
of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, 
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”115  Such 
“common knowledge” as to one’s shed DNA would include, at the 
least, it being accessible to the police with the use of sophisticated 
biotechnological tools for comparison to crime-scene samples or 
inclusion in a database, or both. 
Courts’ analyses of other sets of privacy-in-public cases reveal a 
similar approach.  The premise of fingerprint, voice-exemplar, and 
handwriting-exemplar cases rests on individuals knowingly 
exposing their fingerprints,116 voices,117 and handwriting118 to the 
public.   And, in United States v. Jones, the Court found that 
Antoine Jones had not abandoned his expectation of privacy in his 
aggregated public behavior by going out in public.119 
The fingerprint example is particularly important as 
commentators have debated the appropriateness of analogizing 
surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA to surreptitious 
harvesting of fingerprints.120  Superficially, the analogy is 
attractive as, in each instance, the police are harvesting from 
publicly available samples what will turn into identity 
information.  
The analogy fails, however.  It is “common knowledge” that 
whenever you touch something in public, you run the risk of 
leaving fingerprints that can be used for identification purposes.  
                                                                                                                   
 114 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 115 Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted). 
 116 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (“Fingerprinting involves none of the 
probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or 
search.”). 
 117 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (“The physical characteristics of a 
person’s voice, its tone and manner . . . are constantly exposed to the public.”). 
 118 See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (“Handwriting . . . is repeatedly 
shown to the public . . . .”). 
 119 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–51 (2012). 
 120 Compare Joh, supra note 39, at 871 (rejecting the appropriateness of the fingerprint 
analogy), with Kaye, supra note 48, at 420 (supporting the appropriateness of the 
fingerprint analogy). 
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The same cannot be said about shed, out-of-body DNA—even if its 
use is only for comparison to crime-scene samples by way of the 
application of sophisticated biotechnological tools to the DNA or 
inclusion in a database, or both.121  
In Kyllo, the focus was on the intrusion by the police into the 
intimacy of what occurred within the home.122  The heat that the 
police measured outside of the home was their window into that 
intimacy and thus was an impermissible Fourth Amendment 
intrusion.123 
Had the majority focused on the abandoned heat itself, they 
would have found no violation as the police “acquired” the heat 
outside the protected area of the home.  Absent any evidence that 
Kyllo knew that heat was escaping from his house and that it 
could reveal intimate details of home activity by virtue of 
technology not generally available to the public, the majority 
ignored any possible abandonment analysis.  In a surreptitious-
harvesting case, if “measurement” of the shed, out-of-body DNA 
provides the police with a similar window into some measure of 
genetic intimacy or privacy and no evidence exists of the shedder’s 
knowledge of that, a Fourth Amendment violation may well have 
occurred even though the DNA was left in public. 
C.  THE OUT-OF-BODY FALLACY 
Some of the surreptitious-harvesting courts—Sigsbee and 
Athan—also transacted the Katz analysis with a focus on the 
intrusion on one’s body in addition to the intrusion-on-property 
focus.  The Athan court rejected the claim that Athan had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his bodily fluids on the mailed 
envelope because those fluids were not taken as a part of an 
intrusive procedure.124  
                                                                                                                   
 121 This analysis does not rely on the genetic-exceptionalism argument Joh relies on.  It 
also sidesteps the debate between Kaye and Cole on how much genetic information is 
actually available as a result of standard forensic DNA testing.  See supra note 49 and 
accompanying text. 
 122 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001). 
 123 Id. 
 124 State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 33 (Wash. 2007). 
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The essence of this approach is that any expectation of privacy 
departs when the DNA leaves the body because it is no longer part 
of the body.  At one level, it is a variant of the abandonment 
analysis.  However, the focus in this analysis is directly on the 
location of the DNA rather than on its status as property.  Simply, 
where the DNA is located tells all.   
It is seductive to define an expectation of privacy in one’s body 
in terms of the physical boundaries of the body.  The 
quintessential Fourth Amendment bodily privacy case, Schmerber 
v. California, involved the police entering Schmerber’s body to 
obtain a sample of his blood for blood–alcohol analysis.125  It is 
hard to divorce the sense that a privacy intrusion has occurred 
from the physical act of entering the body.  Often, the entry is 
minimal, as when acquiring scrapings from underneath 
fingernails126 or acquiring DNA by swabbing the inside of one’s 
mouth.127  Nonetheless, courts have routinely held that an 
intrusion on a reasonable expectation of privacy occurred.128 
The advent of forensic DNA technology has begun to stretch the 
boundaries of what counts as the “body.”  Because a forensic 
scientist can analyze cells invisible to the naked eye and obtain 
analyzable DNA129 from cells that exist outside the body,130 the 
police need not intrude on the body itself to obtain what heretofore 
had been unobtainable without a bodily intrusion.  The question in 
surreptitious-harvesting cases becomes whether the out-of-body 
status of the DNA automatically eliminates any Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
Two cases inform the beginning of an answer to this question.  
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, regulations 
promulgated by the Federal Railway Administration required 
                                                                                                                   
 125 384 U.S. 757, 758–59 (1966). 
 126 Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 292 (1973). 
 127 Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005); State v. O’Hagen, 914 A.2d 
267, 279 (N.J. 2007).  So-called buccal swabs are now the most common method for 
obtaining DNA samples from a number of classes of individuals for analysis and inclusion 
in state and federal genetic databases.  
 128 Goord, 430 F.3d at 658; O’Hagen, 914 A.2d at 280. 
 129 BUTLER, supra note 16, at 35. 
 130 See supra notes 21–35 and accompanying text. 
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railroads to test certain employees for drug and alcohol through 
urine testing.131  The collection of the urine sample could involve 
in-person monitoring but no physical intrusion into the body 
occurred.132  In spite of the lack of any bodily intrusion, the Court 
found it “clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes 
upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as 
reasonable”133 and directly addressed the significance of the lack of 
bodily intrusion: 
It is not disputed, however, that chemical analysis of 
urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private 
medical facts about an employee, including whether he 
or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.  Nor can it be 
disputed that the process of collecting the sample to be 
tested, which may in some cases involve visual or 
aural monitoring of the act of urination, itself 
implicates privacy interests.134  
For the Skinner Court, unlike the surreptitious-harvesting courts, 
the lack of bodily intrusion did not automatically remove the 
possibility of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the out-of-body 
fluids and their content.135 
The possibility that a person may have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy that society is willing to recognize in out-of-body DNA 
does not resolve the issue.  It may be that the sense of genetic 
privacy that one has in one’s out-of-body DNA does not rise to the 
level of an expectation of privacy that society is willing to 
recognize, as it did in the privacy “flowing” from the urine in 
Skinner and as partially described in another mandatory-
urinalysis case, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab: 
                                                                                                                   
 131 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989). 
 132 Id. at 617. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 See generally Justin A. Alfano, Note, Look What Katz Leaves Out: Why DNA Collection 
Challenges the Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1017 (2005) (arguing 
for an expansive view beyond bodily intrusion for what constitutes a search). 
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There are few activities in our society more personal or 
private than the passing of urine. Most people describe 
it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a 
function traditionally performed without public 
observation; indeed, its performance in public is 
generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.136 
That consideration is the focus of Part V.  Because courts 
narrowly analyze surreptitious-harvesting cases, however, they 
never reach that challenging core question. 
D.  THE LIMITED-USE-OF-INFORMATION FALLACY 
One surreptitious-harvesting court briefly conducted an 
analysis focused on a possible intrusion on personal information.  
The Athan court concluded that Athan’s Fourth Amendment 
privacy right was unaffected because the use by the police of his 
out-of-body DNA was “narrowly limited to identification 
purposes.”137  David Kaye contends that the surreptitious 
harvesting of out-of-body DNA is, in the end, no different than the 
harvesting of fingerprints left in public. One premise of his 
contention is that the information obtained from standard 13-loci 
STR DNA testing is of no greater personal dimension than that 
obtained from fingerprints.138  That scientific contention has been 
the focus of much of the debate about surreptitious harvesting 
among some commentators. 
This analytical approach suffers from the same narrow scope 
that has plagued courts’ intrusion-on-property and intrusion-on-
body analyses.  If the analytical focus is on the individual’s 
expectation of privacy rather than on the information itself, one 
considers not only the information actually obtained by the police 
but also the potential information that could be obtained by the 
                                                                                                                   
 136 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
 137 State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 34 (Wash. 2007).  The court’s conclusion was contra an 
assertion by an amicus—the ACLU—that out-of-body DNA “has the potential to reveal a 
vast amount of personal information, including medical conditions and familial relations.” 
Id. 
 138 Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 52, at 436–40; Kaye, supra note 38, at 64–65. 
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practice and, by implication, an individual’s concern for its 
potential use.  
The Athan court and Professor Kaye essentially suggest that no 
intrusion on an expectation of privacy occurs in a surreptitious 
DNA harvesting because, like the fingerprint harvesting, the 
information obtained is limited and can only be used in a very 
limited way—for identification.139  
This approach is inconsistent with Skinner and Kyllo.  In Kyllo, 
the thermal-imaging technology detected heat consistent with 
growing marijuana with high-intensity lights.140  Still, Kyllo had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy because of the potential of 
thermal-imaging technology in general—of crude quality or 
otherwise—to detect intimate details within the home.141  The 
Court explicitly rejected “[l]imiting the prohibition of thermal 
imaging to ‘intimate details.’ ”142  In Skinner, the Court confronted 
a chemical test of urine for drugs and alcohol and said, “chemical 
analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private 
medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is 
epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.”143 The potential for intrusion on 
                                                                                                                   
 139 Athan, 158 P.3d at 34; Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 52, at 436–40; Kaye, supra 
note 49, at 71.   
     For the debate among Joh, Kaye, and Cole on the can-only-be-used issue, see supra note 
51 and accompanying text.  
 140 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001). 
 141 The Court:  
rejected such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in 
Katz, where the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that 
reached the exterior of the phone booth.  Reversing that approach would 
leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology—including 
imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home.  
While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule 
we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already 
in use or in development. 
Id. at 35–36.  
 142 Id. at 38.  In doing so, it said that “[l]imiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to 
‘intimate details’ would not only be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in 
application, failing to provide ‘a workable accommodation between the needs of law 
enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.’ ”  Id. (quoting Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984)).  
 143 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 602, 617 (1989). 
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information created an expectation of privacy in Kyllo and in 
Skinner. 
Even if one only relies on the genetic nametag generated by the 
standard 13-loci DNA testing—the genetic fingerprint—the 
potential for intrusions on an individual’s expectation of privacy 
expand beyond those associated with a fingerprint.   For example, 
the provisions of the Federal CODIS database legislation allow for 
the inclusion of the DNA identification records of “other persons 
whose DNA samples are collected under applicable legal 
authorities, provided that DNA samples that are voluntarily 
submitted solely for elimination purposes shall not be included in 
the National DNA Index System.”144  
This language suggests that one’s harvested genetic nametag 
will appear in the Federal CODIS database as long as such 
harvesting is constitutional.  Once in the database, an “innocent” 
individual may be the subject of a coincidental match with a crime-
scene sample, a match that would likely at least require 
explanation or a partial match, a match that might lead to a court-
authorized search of the family members’ genetic profiles.145   That 
individual may also be the subject of an erroneous match, 
intentional or otherwise.146   
More significantly, unlike the use of a DNA sample taken by 
authorization of state or federal statute, the use of a 
surreptitiously harvested sample is likely unregulated by 
statute.147  It could be included in what has been referred to as 
                                                                                                                   
 144 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
 145 Frederick R. Bieber et al., Finding Criminals Through DNA of Their Relatives, 312 
SCIENCE 1315, 1315–16 (2006); David R. Paoletti et al., Assessing the Implications for Close 
Relatives in the Event of Similar but Nonmatching DNA Profiles, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 161, 
162 (2006); Nakashima, supra note 5. 
 146 Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic 
Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 892 (2005). 
 147 Joh, supra note 39, at 875–76.  None of the database legislation collected at http:// 
www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/statute_grid_4_5_2006.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2008) seems to 
contain exclusivity provisions prohibiting collection of surreptitious and other samples for 
inclusion in other, “off-line” databases.  One Erie County, New York crime lab is 
aggressively developing a database with samples from crime victims.  Tom Precious, Crime 
Lab Lambasted over DNA Databases; Policies Defended as Needed Both to Solve and 
Prevent Crimes, BUFF. NEWS, May 21, 2006, at A1.   
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either a “linkage” or “rogue” database of suspects’ or others’ 
profiles.148  The sample could be analyzed for information far 
beyond that provided by the more standard 13-loci STR testing, 
including not only skin pigmentation, bio-geographical origin, 
gender, and eye color but also a host of medical diseases, medical 
and behavioral predispositions, and perhaps even sexual 
orientation.149   
To be sure, no evidence currently exists that such analysis is 
occurring.  But, with the use of surreptitiously harvested samples 
currently unregulated by the Constitution or otherwise, the 
specter of “function creep” looms.150  The question whether 
surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA with these potential 
uses intrudes on an expectation of privacy that society is willing to 
recognize as reasonable is much more complex. 
When the focus is properly on an intrusion upon privacy 
instead, the scope of the analysis widens.  The abandonment 
question becomes whether an expectation of privacy is abandoned 
rather than an object.  The out-of-body status of surreptitiously 
harvested DNA does not automatically resolve the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy question.  The very limited STR 
identification information and its equally limited current use 
expand into a much wider array of genetic information and uses.151 
                                                                                                                   
 148 Richard Willing, Authorities Find More Uses for DNA Databases, USA TODAY (Mar. 26, 
2007), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-03-25-dna-databases-i 
nside_n.htm. 
 149 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 849–51 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting) (addressing potential scope of DNA identification given advancing technology); 
Joh, supra note 39, at 876–79 (same); Laura A. Matejik, DNA Sampling: Privacy and Police 
Investigation in a Suspect Society, 61 ARK. L. REV. 53, 59 (2009) (same). 
 150 Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California’s Proposition 69: A Dangerous 
Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 199, 201–04 (2006); Joh, 
supra note 39, at 878–79. 
 151 An explanation of why courts have so consistently misapplied Katz in surreptitious-
harvesting cases is slightly off topic, though related.  At least three plausible explanations 
exist for this overly narrow approach.  (1) It seems like a fingerprint; some people call it 
“DNA fingerprinting”; let’s treat it like a fingerprint.  (2) All surreptitious harvesting cases 
to date have involved what I have called putative suspects, i.e., someone for whom the 
police have some suspicion but not enough to get a search warrant. It is plausible to believe 
that, at least at an unconscious level, a judge has thought, “it’s not as if we’re talking about 
the privacy of a ‘completely’ innocent person” and has allowed the bias to restrain 
unconsciously the depth of the analysis.  (3) The average layperson, including judges, likely 
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A proper reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis must 
consider the nature and scope of DNA or genetic privacy.  
However, that expansion in focus does not automatically provide 
an answer.  Part V takes on the challenge of crafting a preliminary 
sketch of an expectation of genetic privacy that society might be 
willing to recognize as reasonable in these circumstances.    
V.  “AN EXPECTATION OF GENETIC PRIVACY . . .” 
Crafting the sketch of Fourth Amendment genetic privacy is 
complex.  Privacy itself is a multi-dimensional, often amorphous 
concept that has meant many different things to many different 
people.  Daniel Solove has suggested a number of different 
conceptions that frequent legal and philosophical discourses about 
privacy:  
(1) the right to be let alone—Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis’s famous formulation of the right to privacy; 
(2) limited access to the self—the ability to shield 
oneself from unwanted access by others; (3) secrecy—
the concealment of certain matters from others; (4) 
control over personal information—the ability to 
exercise control over information about oneself; (5) 
personhood—the protection of one’s personality, 
individuality, and dignity; and (6) intimacy—control 
over, or limited access to, one’s intimate relationships 
or aspects of life.152 
                                                                                                                   
has little knowledge and even less understanding of the possible meanings of the genetic 
information we are acquiring at a faster and faster rate.  See Joh, supra note 39, at 865–69 
(describing the characteristics of genetic information and how commentators have reacted 
to the increased use of DNA in the court system, both of which could sway a judge to 
misapply Katz in surreptitious-harvesting cases).  To ask judges in that position to base 
their judgment on an assessment of the nature and scope of genetic privacy, asks them to 
accomplish a very difficult task. 
 152 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 12–13, (2008).  Solove argues 
persuasively that none of these conceptions capture the common denominator of privacy, id. 
at 14, and goes on to propose a “taxonomy of privacy” that seeks to provide a better 
understanding of privacy, id. at 101–02. 
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The Supreme Court has described the idea of constitutional 
privacy from a number of perspectives beyond the formal confines of 
the Fourth Amendment.  The line of cases that includes Griswold v. 
Connecticut (privacy and birth control), Roe v. Wade (privacy and 
pregnancy termination) and Lawrence v. Texas (privacy and 
consensual same-sex sexual activity) captures a view of privacy that 
protects certain personal decisions and behavior from governmental 
interference implicit in a number of constitutional amendments.153  
Whalen v. Roe suggests a constitutional right to informational 
privacy as a matter of due process.154  The cases flowing from the 
Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on a compelled self-incrimination 
effectively describe a privacy right grounded in one’s personal 
dignity.155 
Narrowing the sketch to one of genetic privacy only lessens the 
complexity slightly.  For example, one can readily conceive of some 
aspect of genetic privacy fitting well into each of Solove’s six 
“conceptions of privacy.”156  The Supreme Court has yet to directly 
address genetic privacy as such, be it in informational, decisional–
behavioral, or dignitary privacy terms.157  Yet, as with the broader 
conceptions of privacy, one can envision how genetic privacy 
straddles some of the varieties of constitutional privacy—
informational, decisional–behavioral, or dignitary.  
                                                                                                                   
 153 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding state law forbidding use 
of contraceptives unconstitutional because it intruded upon right of marital privacy); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding right to privacy broad enough to encompass 
woman’s decision whether to terminate pregnancy under Ninth or Fourteenth Amendment); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (holding state law criminalizing some 
consensual same-sex sex acts unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 154 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1977) (recognizing Fourteenth Amendment 
concerns over disclosure to state of prescriptions to certain drugs but ultimately holding no 
violation of such rights or liberties). 
 155 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 457 (1966) (finding the interrogation environment 
to be “destructive of human dignity”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 762 (1966) 
(“[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government—
state or federal—must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.”). 
 156 SOLOVE, supra note 152. 
 157 Though, as a scientific matter, gender-discrimination cases are arguably genetic-
privacy cases. 
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As the Human Genome Project has unfolded, scholars from a 
number of disciplines have taken on the challenge of describing 
conceptions of genetic privacy.158  Bioethicists and moral 
philosophers have considered the question in moral terms.159  
Others have proposed model genetic-privacy legislation,160 and 
legislators have passed numerous versions of such legislation.161  
Researchers and health care professionals have wrestled with 
practical applications of conceptions of genetic privacy.162  A 
number of legal scholars have also addressed the issue.163 
A broad assessment of what constitutional genetic privacy—let 
alone genetic privacy in all its possible legal conceptions—might 
look like and all the places where it might locate itself within the 
Constitution is beyond the scope of this Article.  Instead, my focus 
is only on the nature and scope of Fourth Amendment genetic 
privacy, if any, implicated by the surreptitious harvesting of out-
of-body DNA and whether genetic privacy is something that 
society is willing to recognize as reasonable.   Section V.B will 
                                                                                                                   
 158 See generally Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in 
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31 
(Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (discussing various definitions of “genetic privacy” and the 
legal and ethical values of each). 
 159 See, e.g., Walther Ch. Zimmerli, Who Has the Right to Know the Genetic Constitution of 
a Particular Person, in HUMAN GENETIC INFORMATION: SCIENCE, LAW, AND ETHICS 93 
(Derek Chadwick et al., eds., 1990) (discussing genetic privacy from “information ethics” 
point of view and suggesting perhaps under such view there is no right to private ownership 
of any kind of information). 
 160 See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY 
(1995) (proposing federal legislation to address the privacy concerns relating to genetic 
information in light of the Human Genome Project). 
 161 See the National Conference of State Legislators’ website for a comprehensive catalog 
of state-by-state genetic-privacy legislation, at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/ 
genetic-privacy-laws.aspx (last viewed Aug. 18, 2008). 
 162 See generally DOROTHY C. WERTZ ET AL., GUIDELINES ON ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL 
GENETICS AND THE PROVISION OF GENETIC SERVICES (1995) (discussing genetic-privacy 
issues in light of the Human Genome Initiative from the perspective of healthcare 
professionals). 
 163 Several journals have dedicated symposium-style issues to the topic.  E.g., Symposium, 
Technological Innovation & Legal Tradition: Enduring Principles for Changing Times?, 4 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1 (1999) (discussing various viewpoints on the treatment of genetic 
information); Symposium, Respecting Genetic Privacy: The ASU-58 Conference on Law, 
Science, and Technology, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1999) (proposing a coherent theme for 
genetic privacy). 
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examine constitutional genetic privacy given Fourth Amendment 
conceptions of physical privacy, informational privacy, and 
dignitary privacy—the versions of privacy most implicated by a 
conception of genetic privacy.     
A.   DIRECT FOURTH AMENDMENT GENETIC PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE 
Direct Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as to whether one has 
an expectation of genetic privacy is limited.  As a whole, it only 
starts to outline some of the kinds of privacy concerns that a 
robust portrait would include.  For example, courts frequently 
consider versions of bodily integrity, physical, property, and 
informational privacy when confronted with a genetic-privacy 
circumstance.  A few courts also hint at an additional kind of less 
tangible privacy at stake in genetic privacy cases—one that I will 
later more fully identify as a dignitary-privacy concern.164  None 
develop the full portrait of multi-dimensional genetic privacy. 
Only two surreptitious-harvesting opinions came anywhere 
close to addressing society’s conception of the reasonableness of an 
expectation of genetic privacy.  The Christian court found that the 
defendant did not have an objective expectation of privacy in the 
DNA “in the absence of any definitive authority to the contrary.”165  
The Sigsbee court summarily dismissed the idea of any expectation 
of privacy in bodily fluids (as opposed to one in the items upon 
which the fluids existed): “such theory would prohibit any and all 
testing upon items obtained from an individual regardless of 
whether they were lawfully or unlawfully obtained.   This is not 
only an unacceptable premise but would be an unreasonable 
extension of an individuals [sic] expectation of privacy absent any 
legitimate constitutional basis.”166  Neither the Christian nor the 
                                                                                                                   
 164 See infra Part V.B.3.  
 165 State v. Christian, No. 04-0900, 2006 WL 2419031, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006).  
The Athan court found “no inherent privacy interest in saliva” and chose not to address any 
possible significant privacy interest in DNA because “the State’s use of Athan’s DNA here 
was narrowly limited to identification purposes.”  State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 33–34 (Wash. 
2007). 
 166 People v. Sigsbee, No. 03-0342, slip op. at 33 (Onondaga, N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Oct. 30, 2003).  
The Sigsbee court failed to appreciate that, even if one recognized an expectation of privacy 
in one’s DNA that society was willing to recognize as reasonable, it would mean only that 
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Sigsbee courts chose to characterize the nature or scope of society’s 
conception of reasonable genetic privacy before dismissing the 
idea. 
Courts have also addressed at least the idea of a broad 
conception of Fourth Amendment genetic privacy in the extensive 
litigation surrounding the constitutionality of investigative genetic 
databases.  Because those cases always involve the collection of 
samples via compelled body intrusion—Buccal swab or blood 
sample—most of the courts do no formal Katz search analysis.167 
Nonetheless, several genetic-database courts have taken the 
opportunity in their analysis of the reasonableness of the search to 
describe the nature of the privacy interest at stake when the 
government acquires an individual’s DNA.  Some courts have used 
a totality-of-the-circumstances balancing test to assess the 
reasonableness of the search involved in getting a blood or saliva 
sample.168  That test asks the court to balance the nature of the 
privacy interest at stake and the degree of intrusion on that 
interest against the importance of the governmental interest at 
stake.169 
Not surprisingly, those genetic-database opinions that have 
directly evaluated the nature of the privacy interest at stake often 
conceptualized the interest as one grounded in well-established 
privacy conceptions of bodily integrity or in information, or both.  
Most commonly, genetic-database opinions focusing on bodily 
integrity—the degree of physical intrusion into the body—
analogized the intrusion to that of taking blood, fingerprints, or 
photographs.170  Some of those courts used those physical-intrusion 
                                                                                                                   
the police would be required to justify their search by showing probable cause or some other 
quantum of evidence.  It would not “prohibit any and all testing.”  Id. 
 167 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g(a)–(e) (West 2009) (compelling certain 
offenders to give DNA samples). 
 168 E.g., United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 182–84 (3d Cir. 2005) (analyzing all 
relevant facts to determine whether it is reasonable to demand that convict give DNA 
sample). 
 169 Id. at 182; see Landry v. Att’y Gen., 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1090–92 (Mass. 1999) (holding 
involuntary collection of DNA from persons convicted of certain crimes was not 
unreasonable search and seizure because it involved little risk or pain and government’s 
interest in making record of convicts was strong).   
 170 E.g., Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (“The bodily 
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analogies as the sole basis for their conceptualization of genetic 
privacy, and others used them in addition to information-intrusion 
analogies.  Both groups of courts found that an individual’s genetic 
privacy had no greater scope than the kind of narrow physical 
privacy at issue with drawing blood or taking fingerprints.171   
The courts that focused primarily on an information conception 
of genetic privacy also relied on analogies to other well-established 
areas of privacy.  Some spoke of the intrusion on information as 
being like that which occurs in the taking of a fingerprint,172 and 
others spoke more broadly of the intrusion being upon identity 
information173—that the state was accessing either information 
about an individual’s identity or the individual’s identity itself.  In 
either case, the courts’ conception of genetic privacy was one-
dimensional.  The intrusion was upon the same kind of limited 
identifying information as when the government fingerprinted an 
individual.  The conception of genetic privacy as information-based 
had no greater scope or depth than that.   
That these courts would view genetic privacy as having only 
physical privacy or limited-information privacy dimensions is 
unsurprising.  The impetus to conceive of the full dimensions of 
genetic privacy was abstract, at best.  It occurred in the context of 
a balancing test with components that were hard to quantify—
                                                                                                                   
intrusion of taking a blood or saliva sample is minimal.  It is not significantly greater than 
taking fingerprints or a photograph.”).  
 171 Id. 
 172 See Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Use of DNA is in this respect no 
different from use of a fingerprint; only the method of obtaining the information differs, and 
for prisoners that is a distinction without importance.”); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 
1340 (10th Cir. 1996) (approving “use of DNA in a manner not significantly different from 
the use of fingerprints”); Vanderlinden v. Kansas, 874 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (D. Kan. 1995) 
(“[T]he court finds persuasive the . . . analogy of the blood and saliva gathering at issue here 
to traditional identification techniques, such as fingerprinting.”); People v. Wealer, 636 
N.E.2d 1129, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“[W]e consider the sampling mandated . . . as 
functionally equivalent to fingerprinting . . . .”). 
 173 See, e.g., Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[L]ike 
fingerprinting, collection of a DNA sample for purposes of identification implicates the 
Fourth Amendment . . . .”); Miller v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1178 (D. 
Kan. 2003) (“The DNA sample is used solely to provide identification information and that 
purpose, and no other, is articulated in 42 U.S.C. § 14135e.  DNA identification is often 
likened to a fingerprint. While some differences exist, they are both identity markers.”). 
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governmental interest, nature of privacy interest,174 and degree of 
intrusion.  The courts were assessing statutory structures that, 
superficially, had all the appearances of earlier physical-
characteristic collections of information for identification purposes 
only, like photographs and fingerprints.175    
What is more surprising are the genetic-database opinions that 
showed some signs of breaking from the classic, narrow physical-
intrusion and information-intrusion paradigms in an effort to give 
fuller dimension to the concept of genetic privacy.  In some 
instances, these courts merely considered and then rejected a 
fuller conception of genetic privacy.  In Nicholas v. Goord, the 
Second Circuit expressed an awareness of the potential for a more 
significant intrusion on privacy because database samples were 
kept permanently: “it is potentially a far greater intrusion than 
the initial extraction of DNA, since the state analyzes DNA for 
information and maintains DNA records indefinitely.”176  The court 
then concluded that the potential intrusion was unlikely given the 
procedural safeguards of New York’s database statute that limited 
the use of the samples.177   
A few genetic-database opinions have sketched some of the 
fuller dimensions of genetic privacy.  Those sketches include a 
                                                                                                                   
 174 Note also that the privacy interest at stake belonged to one convicted of a crime.  As all 
the courts that used the balancing test recognized, one convicted of a crime has a 
diminished expectation of privacy.  See, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306–07 (4th 
Cir. 1992) (“With . . . arrest comes the loss of at least some, if not all, rights to personal 
privacy otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.”); Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1094 
(“[C]onvicted persons . . . have a low expectation of privacy in their identity. . . .”).  
 175 See Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Today, however, the DNA 
Act applies only to felons, and CODIS operates much like an old-fashioned fingerprint 
database (albeit more efficiently).”). 
 176 430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 177 Id.; see also State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 40 n.17 (Md. 2004) (“Although Appellee and 
the amici speak of doomsday type scenarios where every person’s, including non-convicts’, 
DNA would be subject to search by both police and unauthorized persons and soon would be 
subject to nearly unregulated access, the current version of the Maryland DNA Collection 
Act does not even approach such unregulated access to DNA profiles.”). 
  Other courts have acknowledged at least the possibility of a broader conception of 
genetic privacy.  Quander, 440 F.3d at 499–500 (a Kyllo analogy); Padgett v. Donald, 401 
F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2005) (an analogy to female guards watching naked men); State 
ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432, 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that 
blood-testing may be a “greater insult to human dignity than fingerprinting”). 
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much expanded sense of the breadth and depth of the available 
genetic information and a preliminary identification of elements of 
genetic privacy that are grounded in more than just its 
information-laden status.  Those sketches portray a sense that 
fully dimensioned genetic privacy is of a different character than 
the privacy attendant to fingerprinting, photographing, and 
traditional blood testing. 
In Patterson v. State, an Indiana appellate court found that “[a]t 
a minimum, it is clear that the results of DNA analysis provide 
extremely personal information about an individual” even though 
it upheld the constitutionality of the genetic-database statute.178  
In his concurrence in United States v. Kincade, Judge Gould, after 
harkening back to Brandeis and Warren’s seminal article on the 
right to privacy, expressed deep concern about the potential abuse 
of information obtained from DNA: 
In our age in which databases can be “mined” in a 
millisecond using super-fast computers, in which 
extensive information can, or potentially could, be 
gleaned from DNA (even the “junk” DNA currently 
used), and in which this data can easily be stored and 
shared by governments and private parties worldwide, 
the threat of a loss of privacy is real, even if we cannot 
yet discern the full scope of the problem.179 
In a federal district court opinion later overturned by the First 
Circuit, Judge Young articulated a sense of genetic privacy that 
went beyond the tangible boundaries of information and bodily 
integrity: 
 Today this Court faces the latest iteration in the 
growing tension between technology’s ability to 
advance governmental purposes and the Fourth 
Amendment's protection of individual privacy.  This 
tension is faced and resolved by balancing the 
                                                                                                                   
 178 Patterson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 4, 10 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 
 179 379 F.3d 813, 842 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Gould, J., concurring). 
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government’s purpose against the resulting intrusion 
on the individual.  When conducting such a balancing 
test, the immediate and tangible imperatives of the 
governmental purpose often outshine and eclipse the 
more telescopic and inchoate value of personal privacy.  
The willingness to watch the erosion of such rights 
silently is most likely where the vanishing liberties are 
perceived as not our own.  It is even more acute where 
the subjects are those who have derided and evaded, 
through criminal misconduct, the order and legal 
structure on which they now rely.180 
In an earlier case, also reversed by the First Circuit, Judge Keeton 
had characterized the information obtained in DNA database 
searches as “immensely private.”181 
More dramatically, in his dissent in the en banc decision in 
United States v. Kincade, Judge Reinhardt wrote expansively 
about the core upon which DNA testing intruded: 
Yet the current CODIS database, when it is compared 
to its modest beginnings, represents an 
alarming trend whereby the privacy and 
dignity of our citizens [are] being whittled 
away by [ ] imperceptible steps.  Taken 
individually, each step may be of little 
consequence.  But when viewed as a whole, 
there begins to emerge a society quite 
unlike any we have seen—a society in which 
                                                                                                                   
 180 United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 282 (D. Mass. 2007) (emphasis added), 
rev’d, 532 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2008).  The First Circuit did not reject Judge Young’s 
characterization of the privacy interest at stake.  It rejected the result of his balancing.  532 
F.3d at 33–34. 
 181 United States v. Weikert, 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 269 (D. Mass. 2006), rev’d, 504 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2007).  The court said: “Not only is the information itself thus immensely private, 
but the means of storing this information in a centralized database that could potentially be 
accessed for improper reasons is itself a significant intrusion on privacy interests.” Id. 
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government may intrude into the secret 
regions of man's life at will.182 
“The more telescopic and inchoate value of personal privacy,” 
“immensely private,” “privacy and dignity” and “the secret regions 
of man’s life” all speak of a dimension to genetic privacy in 
addition to the physical or the informational—one identifiable as a 
dignitary—privacy dimension.  The dimension of dignitary privacy 
captures a much more intangible sense of violation caused by the 
repeated intrusion on one’s DNA that occurs in genetic-database 
circumstances.  Taken together, the physical integrity, 
informational, and dignitary perspectives on privacy revealed by 
genetic-database cases form the core components of a fully 
dimensioned portrait of genetic privacy worthy of evaluation in the 
surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA circumstance. 
B.  CONCEPTUAL COMPONENTS OF GENETIC PRIVACY 
A focus on physical, informational, and dignitary privacy 
returns us to Solove’s six summary conceptions of privacy: the 
right to be let alone, limited access to the self, secrecy, the control 
of personal information, personhood, and intimacy.183  These 
conceptions each contemplate the protection of some core.  As 
Solove suggests with his “taxonomy of privacy,” the protected core 
of privacy lies within the circumstance at hand rather than in a 
single normative standard good for all purposes.184  Inevitably, it 
varies from circumstance to circumstance.  So, the protected core 
at stake in a home invasion would differ from that in a cyber 
invasion or in a sodomy prosecution. 
In the particular circumstance of surreptitious harvesting, the 
protected core is what I call a kaleidoscope of identity—a 
constantly changing pattern of elements that define one’s sense of 
self.  This sense is physical in that DNA is within the body or a 
                                                                                                                   
 182 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 851 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
 183 SOLOVE, supra note 152. 
 184 Id. at 8–9. 
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part of the body—a cell; it is ubiquitous in that it is in every cell; it 
is permanent; and it is relatively immutable.  The sense of self is 
informational in that DNA contains a broad range of medical and 
other information—information that is personal, predictive, 
intimate, powerful, and shared.  This sense is dignitary in that 
DNA contains the kind and quality of information and is so 
ubiquitous that, in the hands of the government, it may reveal 
more about who individuals are than they themselves will ever 
know. 
In the case law and in public discourse, DNA is often referred to 
as a “code,”185 a “map,”186 a “language,”187 and a “library”188 to 
mention a few.  These metaphors capture the predictive, 
information-laden sense of identity contained within DNA.  One 
might even broaden those metaphors to call DNA an encyclopedia 
of identity that can be consulted repeatedly over time.   
The kaleidoscope metaphor most fully captures the multi-
dimensional nature of the identity that DNA embodies.  Identity 
itself has many components—physical, informational, and 
dignitary to mention only a few.  It can be socially constructed.  It 
can be grounded in the physical and measurable.  It can depend on 
the perception of others.  It can come from one’s own internal 
perception grounded in life experience and may even exist in spite 
of either what others think or what much of the information 
“says.”   
Who one is changes over time.  One’s hair grays or disappears.  
One’s posture and physical bearing alter.  One’s personality, 
malleable as it is or isn’t, evolves over time in response to internal 
and external events—physical and emotional, voluntary, and 
involuntary.  One interacts with the environment in innumerable 
ways and the world’s perception—and one’s own—of who one is 
                                                                                                                   
 185 E.g., THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME 
PROJECT 60 (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992). 
 186 E.g., BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, GENETIC MAPS AND HUMAN IMAGINATIONS: THE LIMITS 
OF SCIENCE IN UNDERSTANDING WHO WE ARE 189 (1998). 
 187 E.g., FRANCIS S. COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF LIFE: DNA AND THE REVOLUTION IN 
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 6 (1st ed. 2010). 
 188 E.g., KEVIN DAVIES, CRACKING THE GENOME: INSIDE THE RACE TO UNLOCK HUMAN 
DNA 33 (2001). 
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depends where one looks and the resolution of that focus.  The 
kaleidoscopic nature of identity mirrors the dynamic, multi-
dimensional core of genetic privacy. 
1.  Physical Privacy.  The term “physical privacy” encompasses 
at least three, often overlapping, versions of the physical.  It can 
refer to the body or bodily integrity—my body is private to me.  It 
can refer to a sense of location—the physical location means it is 
private.  It can also refer to a sense of tangibleness or even 
property—this physical item is mine and you can’t have it or go in 
it.  The language of the Fourth Amendment itself captures 
elements of each of these in its list of examples: “The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .”189 
The crux of the rejection of surreptitious harvesting as a search 
is that the samples retrieved are outside the individual’s body.  In 
the language of those cases, one can hear the echoes of the three 
versions of physical privacy.   
[W]hen the defendant discarded the straw he also 
discarded any expectation of privacy in the DNA 
evidence on the straw.  While it is unlikely that the 
defendant believed that he was discarding bodily fluids 
that would show his DNA profile, nonetheless . . . .190 
 
In any event, we believe the same abandonment 
analysis applies equally to the items seized or the shed 
DNA samples obtained from them.191 
 
The relevant question in this case is whether, when a 
person licks an envelope and places it in the mail, that 
                                                                                                                   
 189 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 190 People v. Sigsbee, No. 03-0342, slip op. at 31–32 (Onondaga, N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Oct. 30, 
2003) (emphasis added). 
 191 State v. Christian, No. 04-0900, 2006 WL 2419031, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006) 
(emphasis added). 
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person retains any privacy interest in his saliva at 
all.192 
 
Our conclusion that Bly had no subjective expectation 
of privacy is compelled not by a finding that he legally 
abandoned them as much as it is by his wholesale 
failure to manifest any expectation of privacy in the 
items whatsoever.193 
The fact that the DNA was not in the individual’s body, that it was 
abandoned, or that it was placed in the mail resolved the matter 
for each of these courts. 
That analytical crux depends on one’s conception of the physical 
and what is being searched.  If one conceives the search to be of 
the cup, cigarette butt, saliva, or blood that is outside the body, 
then DNA’s out-of-body status matters.  One does not enter the 
physical boundaries of the body if one enters the cup, blood, or 
saliva.  An individual most often knowingly abandons such items 
and bodily fluids and would likely have no expectation of privacy 
in them. 
If one conceives of the locus of intrusion as one’s DNA, the 
calculus changes.  If “entry” of the physical boundaries of the body 
occurs when one enters one’s DNA to obtain what will become the 
alphanumeric identification tag used in forensic DNA analysis, 
then it is an intrusion.  Or, if one is mining that which ordinarily 
exists in the traditional boundaries of the body—DNA—without 
entering the body, then it is an intrusion.   
In and of itself, the proposition that any entry of out-of-body 
DNA or an out-of-body cell constitutes an intrusion into the body 
appears to stretch credulity.  It would seem to expand the 
boundaries of what constitutes the body beyond that which is 
either practical or sensible. 
Yet such a seemingly novel conception may not be so far-
fetched.  As discussed previously, the Kyllo Court found that the 
search of a location—a home—occurred even though the home was 
                                                                                                                   
 192 State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 33 (Wash. 2007) (emphasis added). 
 193 Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 357 (Mass. 2007) (emphasis added). 
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never entered.194  The analogy between using thermal-imaging 
technology to discern activity within the home and using forensic-
DNA technology to discern what is in the body is imperfect.  Both 
circumstances recognize that an intrusion can occur without 
crossing a traditional physical boundary. 
Other physical-privacy cases focusing on the location of that 
which is searched buttress the suggestion that neither traditional 
physical boundaries nor location necessarily resolve the Fourth 
Amendment issue.  In United States v. Chadwick, the Supreme 
Court analyzed a situation in which the police were legally in 
possession of a car and legally inside the car.  Therein, they 
discovered a double-locked trunk.195  The police removed the trunk 
from the car; transported it to a federal facility and then opened it 
without a warrant, finding marijuana inside.196  The Court found 
that the police should not have opened the trunk without a 
warrant.197 
In California v. Acevedo, a 1991 follow-up to Chadwick, the 
police stopped a car with probable cause to believe contained a bag 
with marijuana in the trunk.198  In effectively overruling 
Chadwick, the Court found that the police could search the 
container within the car without a warrant as long as they had 
probable cause to search that container.199 
The analogy to surreptitious harvesting is direct, though 
perhaps not intuitive.  When the police seized the envelope in 
Athan, they seized the Chadwick–Acevdo car.  When they removed 
the saliva from the envelope, they seized the Chadwick–Acevdo 
container.  When they entered the cell to extract the DNA, they 
searched the trunk in Chadwick and the bag in Acevedo.   
This analogy also extends to more technologically sophisticated 
circumstances. In cell phone cases, courts have found that the 
phone’s owner has an expectation of privacy in the contents of the 
                                                                                                                   
 194 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–36 (2001). 
 195 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 
500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
 196 Id. at 4–5. 
 197 Id. at 15–16. 
 198 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 567. 
 199 Id. at 580–81. 
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phone.200  For example, in State v. Smith, the police arrested 
Smith and found a cell phone in his possession.201  The police 
searched the cell phone and discovered call records and phone 
numbers of value to their investigation.202  The Ohio Supreme 
Court found that Smith had a protected privacy interest in the 
contents of his cell phone and declined to apply the search-
incident-to-arrest exception, finding that the police should have 
obtained a warrant.203 
The analogy to surreptitious harvesting is direct.  For example, 
when the police seized the envelope in Athan, they seized the 
defendant in Smith.  When they removed the saliva from the 
envelope, they seized the Smith cell phone.  When they entered the 
saliva and its cells to extract the DNA, they searched the contents 
of the cell phone in Smith. 
The import of the Chadwick–Acevedo and Smith analogies is 
plain.  If there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA 
obtained from the search of the saliva and cells in Athan as the 
courts found in the contents of the trunk, bag, and cell phones in 
those cases, then the police must have probable cause and, 
depending on the circumstances, a warrant to search for DNA in 
surreptitious harvesting cases. 
Those analogies hold only if a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in one’s DNA is as merited as a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in a double-locked trunk (Chadwick), a bag (Acevedo), or a cell 
phone (Smith).  A double-locked trunk speaks of a heightened, 
proactive sense of security, a paper bag less so.  A cell phone may 
or may not have security features, though it appears that the 
                                                                                                                   
 200 United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Finley, 477 
F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D. 
Fla. 2009); United States v. Morales–Ortiz, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1139 (D. N.M. 2004); 
State v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1075 (Conn. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1474 (2011).  But 
see United States v. Mercado–Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1276 (D. Kan. 2007) (“Mere 
physical possession or control of property is not sufficient to establish standing to object to a 
search of that property.” (quoting United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 444, 444–46 (10th Cir. 
1990))). 
 201 State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 950 (Ohio 2009). 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at 955. 
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phone in Smith had the kind of security that prevented ready 
scrolling by the police. 
Physically, the surreptitious harvesting search is a search for 
an otherwise inaccessible item and one at the core of one’s physical 
being.  For STR testing, the forensic scientist must isolate the 
DNA molecules from other cellular materials,204 remove any 
possible inhibitors to the PCR process,205 and quantitate the DNA 
to make sure it is from a human subject.206  The analyst then 
amplifies the DNA so that enough exists for analysis207 and 
transforms the fluorescently labeled DNA into an image on an 
electropherogram.208  Only then can the analyst analyze the DNA 
in the original sample. The unlocking of the cellular “trunk” or 
scrolling of the “cellular” phone is a sophisticated molecular 
biological process using, for example, chemicals, enzymes, thermal 
cyclers, and DNA templates.209  
Yet, as inaccessible as DNA is, it is equally ubiquitous.  It is in 
every cell in the human body, whether that cell is a part of skin, 
bodily fluids, hair root, living bone, etc.210  The “item” for 
surreptitious-harvesting searches is also at the physical core of 
every human being.  It is in the nucleus of the cell and is a 
physical starting point for life itself, yet obtaining it through 
surreptitious harvesting causes no pain.211 
Inaccessibility, ubiquity, and existence as a core part of the 
body are the essential physical privacy features of DNA.  Unlike 
the Chadwick–Acevedo circumstance, the inaccessibility is 
passive.212  The “double-lock” naturally exists, albeit with many 
                                                                                                                   
 204 BUTLER, supra note 16, at 42. 
 205 Id. at 49. 
 206 Id. at 50.   
 207 Id. at 63. 
 208 Id. at 330. 
 209 See generally id. (explaining the process of forensic DNA typing as applied to criminal 
forensics). 
 210 Id. at 17, 34. 
 211 Contrast this kind of search to the one in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758 
(1966), where the police, via a physician, obtained a blood sample from a DUI suspect, or to 
the one in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 756 (1985), where the police, via a surgeon, sought 
to surgically remove a bullet from the body of an attempted robbery suspect. 
 212 Unlike a locked trunk, a closed purse, or a bag in a car trunk, the hyper-inaccessibility 
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more locks of much greater technological sophistication.  Its 
ubiquity is unique, and its existence as part of the body’s core is, 
oddly, not dependent on whether it is within or outside the body. 
The fingerprint analogy presents an interesting contrast.  
Fingerprints, though permanent like DNA, are neither 
inaccessible nor at the body’s core.  They exist only on the outside 
of the body and are literally superficial—on one’s fingertips.  A 
forensic scientist must use a measure of discipline and attention to 
detail to develop a fingerprint from an individual’s fingers, let 
alone from a crime scene.213  But the technological or biological 
sophistication necessary to obtain a fingerprint is much less than 
that required for DNA.  
They are, in measure, ubiquitous in that everyone has them 
and they are found on all ten fingers.  However, they possess none 
of the biological ubiquity of DNA.  In terms of the physical privacy 
features, then, fingerprints are not comparable to DNA given 
DNA’s inaccessibility, ubiquity, and existence at the physical core 
of a human. 
That conclusion does not resolve with finality the fingerprint–
DNA comparison though.  What fingerprints and DNA most share 
in common is that they both contain valuable identifying 
information.  Much of the identifying utility of both fingerprints 
and DNA comes from the nature of the information.  However, 
some of it comes from the physical location or existence of the 
information.  Fingerprints are valuable for identification purposes 
because (1) they contain information from the tips of fingers—
accessible, common to every human, and permanent and (2) that 
information is considered “unique.”214  Thus, the surrounding 
physical context for the unique information is an essential 
predicate to their identifying power. 
                                                                                                                   
of DNA is not an active step taken by an individual.  Some might argue that this militates 
against a finding of a subjective expectation of privacy. 
 213 See generally SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND 
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001) (explaining the complexity of the fingerprint identification 
process). 
 214 Putting aside recent litigation surrounding fingerprints.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 26–28 (Mass. 2005) (comparing the degrees to which different 
fingerprinting analysis techniques reliably identify an individual). 
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The same is true with DNA.  Its physical privacy features—
inaccessibility, ubiquity, and existence at the body’s core—provide 
the physical context within which its identifying value becomes 
powerful.  Put differently, it is not just about the substance of the 
information, but it is also about the physical context within which 
it exists.  And one’s identity—part of one’s dignity—also gets 
additional meaning from the physical context.  An examination of 
the informational- and dignitary-privacy aspects of surreptitious 
harvesting will thus fill in the developing portrait of the 
kaleidoscope of identity. 
2.  Informational Privacy.  The informational privacy features of 
DNA are the most prominent colors in the genetic-privacy 
kaleidoscope of identity.  Information from DNA analysis can be 
intimate, personal, shared, predictive, and powerful.  To the extent 
that one’s identity is captured by a composite of data, the DNA 
from surreptitious harvesting captures the full breadth of that 
informational dimension of identity.  
The informational-privacy dimension of DNA has been the 
primary focus of the genetic-database case law on genetic privacy.  
Though every court has, in the end, declined to act based on the 
informational-privacy features of DNA,215 many of them have 
highlighted its potential.  The classic description of DNA’s 
informational value is Judge Reinhardt’s dissent in United States 
v. Kincade: 
What type of information might the government 
eventually be able to extract from samples of junk 
DNA? Even today, as the plurality admits, “DNA 
profiles derived by STR may yield probabilistic 
                                                                                                                   
 215 The courts have arrived at this conclusion because (1) the information obtained for 
inclusion in a genetic database is alphanumeric and one-dimensional and (2) the use of that 
limited information is strictly controlled by statute.  See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 
652, 668 (2d Cir 2005) (observing that “junk DNA” serves no known purpose other than to 
establish identity); State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 33 (Md. 2004) (dismissing fears of 
“unregulated access to DNA profile[s]”); State v. Martin, 955 A.2d 1144, 1155 (Vt. 2008) 
(noting that database indexes genes “not associated with any known physical trait”); State 
v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 34 (Wash. 2007) (acknowledging potential for privacy violations with 
DNA information).  In the surreptitious-harvesting circumstance, neither the state nor the 
federal government appears to regulate the information obtained.         
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evidence of the contributor’s race or sex.”  Yet that 
seems to be a dramatic understatement. The DNA 
“fingerprint” entered into CODIS likely has the 
potential to reveal information about an individual's 
“genetic defects, predispositions to diseases, and 
perhaps even sexual orientation.”  DNA analysis can 
reveal the presence of traits for thousands of known 
diseases, and countless numbers of diseases which are 
currently unknown.  More ominously, some have 
predicted that the DNA profiles entered into CODIS 
will someday be able to predict the likelihood that a 
given individual will engage in certain types of 
criminal, or non-criminal but perhaps socially 
disfavored, behavior.216 
In his dissent in Rise v. Oregon, Judge Nelson also highlighted the 
particularly sensitive nature of the information in DNA: “DNA 
genetic pattern analysis catalogs uniquely private genetic facts 
about the individual that should be subject to rigorous 
confidentiality requirements even broader than the protection of 
an individual’s medical records.”217  In United States v. Weikert, 
Judge Keeton further characterized a genetic database as one in 
which “the files that are kept for perpetuity are replete with 
information the scope of which science has not yet discovered.”218 
The case law thus describes DNA as containing: (1) information 
about genetic defects, predispositions to diseases, perhaps sexual 
orientation, the presence of traits for thousands of known diseases, 
and countless numbers of diseases which are currently unknown; 
(2) possible predictive information about certain types of criminal, 
or noncriminal but perhaps socially disfavored, behavior; (3) more 
generally, information of the most sensitive and personal nature 
                                                                                                                   
 216 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 850 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 217 59 F.3d 1556, 1569 (9th Cir. 1995) (Nelson, J., dissenting), abrogated by City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), and Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 
67 (2001). 
 218 United States v. Weikert, 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 269 (D. Mass. 2006), rev’d, 504 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2007). 
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and a catalog of uniquely private genetic facts more than akin to 
those facts contained in medical records. 
This cascade of information is only a relatively small window 
into the body of new information flowing from recent genetic 
research.  For purposes of a focus on genetic privacy, the salient 
features of the information flowing from that research are that it 
is intimate, personal, shared, predictive, and powerful. 
  a. Predictive.  The predictive nature of genetic information 
is notable.  One of the fundamental features of genetic information 
is its probabilistic nature.  For example, genetic disorders are 
rarely controlled by a single gene that necessarily causes the 
disorder.219  Most information flowing from a genetic analysis, 
particularly as to medical conditions, is predictive rather than 
certain.  For example, the variants of the “breast cancer gene” that 
have been identified as causing cancer only inform carriers such a 
variant that they have an increased likelihood (five-fold) over the 
course of their lifetime of developing breast cancer as compared to 
the general population.220 
Predictive genetic information comes in many shapes, sizes, and 
degrees of certainty.  While newspaper headlines frequently 
trumpet the discovery of the “gene for . . .,” more often what has 
been located is a gene that correlates to the presence of a medical 
disorder, a trait, or a behavior.221  For example, scientists have 
developed correlations between genes and obesity,222 risk-taking,223 
                                                                                                                   
 219 NHS NAT’L GENETICS EDUC. & DEV. CTR., Single Gene Disorder, http://www.geneticsed 
ucation.nhs.uk/teaching-genetics/glossary/single-gene-disorder.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 
2012).  A notable exception is Huntington’s disease.  NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., 
Huntington’s Disease, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001775/ (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2011). 
 220 NAT’L CANCER INST., BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, http:// 
www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA (last visited Aug. 17, 2011). 
 221 See generally GISELA KAPLAN & LESLEY J. ROGERS, GENE WORSHIP: MOVING BEYOND 
THE NATURE/NUTURE DEBATE OVER GENES, BRAIN, AND GENDER (2003) (critiquing the 
frequent genetic explanations for human behavior). 
 222 Alan Herbert et al., A Common Genetic Variant Is Associated with Adult and 
Childhood Obesity, 312 SCIENCE 279, 279 (2006). 
 223 Chin-Hsing Lin et al., The Dosage of the NeuroD2 Transcription Factor Regulates 
Amygdala Development and Emotional Learning, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14877, 14879 
(2005). 
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smoking,224 creative dance,225 schizophrenia,226 and impulsivity 
and violence.227 
DeCODE Genetics, an international biotechnology research 
company in Iceland, advertises diagnostic tests for a variety of 
genetic conditions on its website, including tests for obesity, 
common forms of breast cancer, prostate cancer, glaucoma, 
elevated cholesterol, as well as hypertension and cardiac risk.228  
Its most comprehensive test is a personal genetic scan, 
deCODEme, that “analyses genetic risk factors for 48 diseases 
ranging from heart attack and diabetes to lung cancer and traits 
like ABO bloodtypes, eye color and male pattern baldness.”229  
Other companies like 23andME offer similar services, attracting 
customers with the promise of personalized genetics.230 
To be sure, genetic information about physical traits or 
conditions can be certain.  Forensic tests for eye color, hair color, 
and other traits continue to be developed in an effort to provide 
investigators with a hazy physical portrait of a potential suspect 
drawn from a crime scene sample.231  In terms of informational 
privacy concerns, though, predictive genetic information provides a 
future window into an individual’s life.  George Annas has 
eloquently labeled predictive genetic information a “future diary” 
that “informs our younger selves about our aging selves.”232 
                                                                                                                   
 224 V. Malaiyandi et al., Impact of CYP2A6 Genotype on Pretreatment Smoking Behaviour 
and Nicotine Levels from and Usage of Nicotine Replacement Therapy, 11 MOLECULAR 
PSYCHIATRY 400, 400 (2006). 
 225 Rachel Bachner–Melman et al., AVPR1a and SLC6A4 Gene Polymorphisms Are 
Associated with Creative Dance Performance, 1 PLOS GENETICS 394, 394 (2005). 
 226 Vladimir Vacic et al., Duplications of the Neuropeptide Receptor Gene VIPR2 Confer 
Significant Risk for Schizphrenia, 471 NATURE 499, 499 (2011). 
 227 Andreas Meyer–Lindenberg et al., Neural Mechanisms of Genetic Risk for Impulsivity 
and Violence in Humans, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas. 
0511311103 (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
 228 DECODE GENETICS, http://www.decode.com/products/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2011). 
 229 Id. 
 230 23ANDME, http://www.23andme.com/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).  23andMe uses the 
catch phrase, “Genetics just got personal.” 
 231 TONY N. FRUDAKIS, MOLECULAR PHOTOFITTING: PREDICTING ANCESTRY AND 
PHENOTYPE USING DNA 613 (2008). 
 232   It is in code and probabilistic, but just as private.  It is information about 
you, information about which you should have a right not to know, a right 
to say, “I don't want to know this.”  But even if you want to know it, you 
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  b. Shared.  Genetic information is also shared information.  
Because genetic information is hereditary, the DNA of blood 
relatives is more similar than that of the unrelated population.  
For example, with paternity testing, laboratories compare the 
DNA of a putative parent and child to determine possible 
parentage.233  One begins to know to whom one is related when one 
is in possession of an individual’s DNA.  As noted above, this 
proposition has formed the basis for the activities of amateur 
genealogists, divorce lawyers, and DNA paparazzi.234 
Prosecutors have also begun to use genetic information taken 
from DNA more creatively.  Based on the work of Mark Shriver 
and others, tests exist to discern bio-geographical information from 
DNA—testing that purports to identify, at least, the continent of 
origin of the human source of the sample.235  For example, a serial 
murder case in Louisiana changed direction based on bio-
geographical testing that directed the police to a non-Caucasian 
suspect rather than a Caucasian suspect.236 
Even more recently, the police and prosecutors have engaged in 
a practice known as familial searching—an outgrowth of the 
compilation of state-by-state and federal databases containing 13-
loci genetic information on those convicted of certain crimes.  The 
police submit the 13-loci genetic profile of the crime-scene sample 
                                                                                                                   
should have a right to say, “I don't want anybody else to know it.  I don't 
want my employer to know it.  I don’t want the FBI to know it.  I don’t want 
my school to know it.  I don’t want my colleagues to know it.  I don’t want 
my spouse to know it.  I don’t want my children to know it.”  It should be 
your choice. . . . [I]n terms of information, I believe that our DNA resembles 
a future diary that is due the same privacy that we afford other written 
diaries. 
George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought To Be a Law, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
9, 11 (1999). 
 233 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 53–54 
(1996). 
 234 See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.  See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic 
Stalking and Voyeurism: A New Challenge to Privacy, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 539 (2009) 
(discussing uses and publication of genetic information and recommending legislation). 
 235 FRUDAKIS, supra note 231, at 35–145. 
 236 Nicholas Wade, Unusual Use of DNA Aided in Serial Killer Search, N.Y. TIMES, June 
3, 2003, at A28. 
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of unknown origin into the CODIS database.237  Sometimes, the 
search produces a partial match in which the sample of unknown 
origin matches the sample of known origin at, most often, six or 
more loci but not all.238  Such a result strongly suggests that the 
individual who contributed the crime-scene sample is closely 
related to the individual in the database.239   
The prosecution then seeks a search warrant to get a blood 
sample from relevant relatives of the database individual, basing 
their claim of probable cause on the suggestive partial match.240  
These examples confirm that genetic information from DNA tells 
others not only information about who you are—physically and 
going forward—but also to whom you are related and to what 
ancestral groups you belong.  Genetic information is shared 
information that is identifying both at an individuating level—to 
whom you “belong”—and at a group-membership level—you belong 
with them. 
  c. Personal and Intimate.  Because it contains both 
predictive and shared information, DNA information is also 
personal and intimate.  As a present and future diary, it catalogs 
knowledge about, for example, current and possible future medical 
conditions that an individual could otherwise choose to disclose.  
Therein lies much of the basis for the genetic-privacy laws that so 
many states have passed.  
Strikingly, someone in possession of others’ DNA would be able 
to learn information about them that they do not know about 
themselves.  Consider the circumstance in which a genetic 
counselor becomes aware that a couple’s child only has a genetic 
relationship to one of the parents.  The personal and intimate 
nature of such information in the hands of a third party is 
apparent.   And note that in the context of Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                   
 237 Jules Epstein, “Genetic Surveillance”—The Bogeyman Response to Familial DNA 
Investigations, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 141, 145. 
 238 Id. at 146. 
 239 Id.   
 240 Id. at 145–46. 
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genetic privacy, the third party with that knowledge would be the 
government.241 
  d. Powerful.  The predictive, shared, personal, and intimate 
nature of genetic information also makes it powerful.  The degree 
of that power is reflected in the variety of laws passed to rein in its 
abuse.  Most states now have genetic antidiscrimination laws in 
the provision of health insurance.242  A number of states have such 
laws addressing the employment context,243 and genetic-privacy 
laws are quite common.244 
Even pseudo-genetic information has had power, historically.  
The eugenics era in this and other countries in the first part of the 
twentieth century is a vivid and painful historical reminder of the 
power of genetic information.  Hundreds of thousands of 
individuals were sterilized based on pseudo-genetic information.245  
Carrie Buck, the subject of the infamous Buck v. Bell case 
upholding the constitutionality of involuntary sterilization,246 was 
committed to the Virginia Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded, 
in Lynchburg and involuntarily sterilized because she, her mother, 
and her daughter were believed to be “feebleminded,” then viewed 
as a hereditary condition.247  
The scope of eugenic legislation went beyond involuntary 
sterilization statutes.  More than twenty-five states revised their 
marriage laws to prevent the “biological continuation” of the 
unfit.248  Immigration restrictions were passed that used “IQ” tests 
                                                                                                                   
 241 It is critical, once again, to recognize in this discussion of what is genetic privacy that 
the focus is on the individuals’ expectation of privacy in their DNA, not on their level of 
certainty as to whether the government has or would access such information or what the 
government would do with such information if it had or did access the information.  
 242 Nancy E. Kass, The Implications of Genetic Testing for Health and Life Insurance, in 
GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 158, at 299, 312–13. 
 243 Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in 
GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 158, at 281, 291–93. 
 244 E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-H (“[N]o individual . . . shall be required to undergo 
genetic testing as a condition of doing business with another person.”). 
 245 See DANIEL KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN 
HEREDITY 100 (1985) (discussing introduction of sterilization laws in the United States). 
 246 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 247 KEVLES, supra note 245, at 110–11. 
 248 Id. at 99–100. 
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to restrict immigration, particularly of Eastern and Southern 
Europeans.249    
*** 
The powerful, intimate, personal, predictive, and shared nature 
of information from DNA—its multi-dimensional informational 
quality—contrasts sharply with the one-dimensional quality of the 
information flowing from fingerprints.  Fingerprint information is 
unique but unshared—no two people have the same fingerprints.  
It has no predictive value of which anyone is aware.  The 
information it provides is neither intimate nor personal in the 
nature.   
Fingerprints share one aspect with DNA information: its 
identifying power.  Like forensic DNA information, fingerprints 
can identify the source of a crime-scene sample and is a potent 
investigative tool when available.  Otherwise, it is profoundly one-
dimensional, quite different from the multi-dimensional cascade of 
DNA information.250 
DNA’s multi-dimensional cascade is also profoundly identifying.  
To the extent that at least some of one’s identity can be captured 
by a matrix of data, data from DNA does that.  The cascade of 
data—about physical features, medical conditions and 
predispositions, behavioral conditions and predispositions, 
ancestry, relatedness and group membership etc.—substantially 
enriches the image of the kaleidoscope of identity at the core of 
genetic privacy. 
A set of distorting concepts accompanies the association of 
genetic information with identity.  One is the risk of the 
“geneticization” of identity—you are your disease(s) or you are 
your genes.251  Associated risks are those of genetic determinism—
your genes determine who you are—and genetic essentialism—
                                                                                                                   
 249 Id. at 94–95. 
 250 Interestingly, while fingerprints can be obliterated to some extent by physical 
mutilation, DNA cannot, thereby lending it an informational permanence akin to its 
physical permanence. 
 251 See Jennifer Fitzgerald, Geneticizing Disability: The Human Genome Project and the 
Commodification of Self, 14 ISSUES L. & MED. 147, 153 (1998) (arguing that wealth of 
genetic information discovered by Human Genome Project could intensify risk that people 
with disabilities will have their identity reduced to disease or disability). 
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what your genes say about you is all we need to know about you.252  
And the risk of genetic exceptionalism completes the list of 
concepts attending to the association of genetic information with 
identity. 
The identity features of genetic information are different from 
these concepts.  Genetic information tells us something about who 
one is.  It does not tell us about the essence of a person253 to the 
exclusion of other components of identity, be it the social 
construction of identity or one’s own sense of who one is.   
The construction of identity is a complex, layered phenomenon 
that resists essentialist simplicity.  Anthropologists have long 
debated identity essentialism and have brought that discussion to 
the world of genetics.254  Since the earliest days of the new genetic 
research, biologists have struggled with the concepts of genetic 
determinism and essentialism.  Richard Lewontin and others have 
written at length and compellingly about the dangers of drawing 
too much meaning from one’s genes to the exclusion of other 
fundamental factors at play in genetic expression like environment 
and the host organism.255  GATTACA, a recent movie, captures one 
dystopic version of a society overly obsessed with deterministic 
essentialism of genetic identity.256  
To say that DNA contains information that tells one, and 
others, a lot about oneself is not to say that it tells one all one 
needs to know about oneself or necessarily the most important 
                                                                                                                   
 252 See id. at 154 (associating genetic essentialism and biological determinism with the 
problem of geneticization of identity). 
 253 See Hugh Miller, III, DNA Blueprints, Personhood, and Genetic Privacy, 8 HEALTH 
MATRIX 179, 219 (1998) (“DNA structure should not be conflated with the ‘essential encoder’ 
of an immutable personal identity or character.”). 
 254 See, e.g., Paul Brodwin, Genetics, Identity, and the Anthropology of Essentialism, 75 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 323 passim (2002) (discussing some of the issues that arise when 
genetic information is used to help determine cultural identity). 
 255 See generally R.C. LEWONTIN ET AL., NOT IN OUR GENES: BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY, AND 
HUMAN NATURE (1984) (discussing the political and social ideologies that underlie biological 
determinism and arguing that determinists miss a number of important factors in human 
behavior beyond simple genetics, such as environment); RICHARD LEWONTIN, THE TRIPLE 
HELIX: GENE, ORGANISM AND ENVIRONMENT (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (discussing the 
danger of viewing an organism as merely “computed” from its DNA rather than taking into 
account environment and other factors). 
 256 GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997). 
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essence of one’s identity.  Genetic information contributes to the 
portrait of identity and need not be diminished or exaggerated in 
its importance to do so. 
Yet the kaleidoscopic nature of the identity captured by the 
physical and informational aspects of DNA is very robust.  The 
hallmarks of its physical and informational natures—
inaccessibility, uniqueness, permanence, and existence at the 
body’s core, and its powerful, intimate, personal, predictive, and 
shared nature—exist not only in the present but over the 
dimensions of time and space.  One’s DNA is present at one’s 
beginning.  Some of it is present before one’s beginning—in one’s 
ancestors—and some of it is present after one’s end—in one’s 
descendants.   
The spatial and temporal dynamism of DNA’s physical and 
informational presence also accentuate the kaleidoscopic nature of 
the identifying features it possesses.  For example, one piece of 
DNA does not exist in isolation from another.  Often, one region of 
DNA interacts with another region to produce “an effect.”  For 
example, some cancers involve the mutation of genes which, 
unmutated, would suppress the unregulated growth of certain 
cells—cells which themselves are produced by other genes.257   
More broadly, as with the sequencing of human genomes has 
intensified, scientists have become increasingly aware of the 
profound dynamism within the human genome, even in regions of 
DNA thought to be dormant or unused.  The ENCODE Project 
Consortium has begun looking at non-gene regions of DNA and 
has concluded that “through the analysis of 1% of the human 
genome that the humble, unpretentious nongene sequences have 
essential regulatory roles.”258   
                                                                                                                   
 257 See SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE EMPEROR OF ALL MALADIES: A BIOGRAPHY OF 
CANCER 368–69 (2010) (discussing how the lack of “negative” genes leads to the formation of 
cancer cells). 
 258 John M. Greally, Encyclopedia of Humble DNA, 447 NATURE 782, 782 (2007) 
(discussing The Encode Project Consortium, Identification and Analysis of Functional 
Elements in 1% of the Human Genome by the ENCODE Pilot Project, 447 NATURE 799 
(2007)).  The regions the consortium studied had previously been known as regions 
containing “junk” DNA— DNA of no known use.  See Gina Kolata, Bits of Mystery DNA, Far 
From ‘Junk,’ Play Crucial Role, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.  
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Multi-factorial genetic disorders—disorders that have genetic, 
behavioral, and environmental roots—are much more common 
than Mendelian genetic disorders.  The interplay between genes, 
environment, and behavior is the hallmark of multi-factorial 
disorders, such as some types of cancer, asthma,259 and diabetes.260   
Interactions between one’s genes, the physical environment within 
or outside one’s body, or with the consequences of one’s behavior 
may cause genes to be turned off or on or to take a different path of 
expression.   
The recent understanding that many complex disorders have, 
among other things, genetic roots stands at the beginning of a 
much more profound scientific understanding of such disorders as 
asthma, atherosclerosis, diabetes, hypertension, and obesity.261  It 
already tells us how profoundly DNA is intertwined in a layered, 
dynamic process refracting through time and space to create 
portions of who we are, physically and informationally.  It is a 
multi-faceted, multi-generational kaleidoscope of identity. 
This image of a kaleidoscope of identity refracting through time 
and space is a complex metaphor with little parallel.  Michael 
Ondaatje, in his novel Divisadero, describes a belfry that has been 
                                                                                                                   
com/2012/09/06/science/far-from-junk-dna-dark-matter-proves-crucial-to-health.html?page  
wanted=all (noting that DNA studied by ENCODE Project was previously considered “junk” 
DNA).  As Greally entertainingly explains:  
The results of the pilot phase of this project, which involved an analysis of 
1% (30 megabases) of the human genome, are not good news for genes, 
which will no longer be able to hog the limelight. Even this preliminary 
study reveals that the genome is much more than a mere vehicle for genes, 
and sheds light on the extensive molecular decision-making that takes 
place before a gene is expressed. 
Greally, supra, at 783. 
 259 See generally F.D. Martinez, Genes, Environments, Development and Asthma: A 
Reappraisal, 29 EUR. RESPIRATORY J. 179 (2007) (studying interactions between genetic 
determinants for asthma and their genetic, environmental, and developmental contexts). 
 260 See generally Ulf Risérus et al., Dietary Fats and Prevention of Type 2 Diabetes, 48 
PROGRESS IN LIPID RES. 44 (2009) (studying the effect of dietary fat on the risk of type 2 
diabetes). 
 261 See Ron Korstanje & Beverly Paigen, From QTL to Gene: The Harvest Begins, 31 
NATURE GENETICS 235 passim (2002) (discussing the technique of mapping QTL genes, 
which identifies chromosomal regions affecting various illnesses, and asserting that “the 
harvest of QTL genes is just beginning”). 
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constructed like a coil or screw and analogizes it to a helix.262  It 
provokes his character to consider the helical effect of his memory.  
He relates it to the effect of a villanelle, a particular poetic form in 
which tercets recur and repeat themselves: 
It’s like a villanelle, this inclination of going back to 
events in our past, the way the villanelle’s form 
refuses to move forward in linear development, circling 
instead at those familiar moments of emotion.  Only 
the rereading counts, Nabokov said.  So the strange 
form of that belfry, turning onto itself again and again, 
felt familiar to me.  For we live with those retrievals 
from childhood that coalesce and echo throughout our 
lives, the way shattered pieces of glass in a 
kaleidoscope reappear in new forms and are songlike 
in their refrains and rhymes, making up a single 
monologue.  We live permanently in the recurrence of 
our own stories, whatever story we tell.263 
To paraphrase Ondaatje, the complex image of the kaleidoscope 
of identity that is DNA coalesces and echoes throughout our lives, 
reappearing in new forms over time and space, yet making up a 
single identity.  We live permanently in the recurrence of our 
DNA, whatever identity we show. 
As noted above, genetic information is powerful, personal, 
intimate, shared, and predictive.  These features make it different 
than other information.  But one need not label that information 
exceptional in its features in order to appreciate those features for 
the purpose of understanding genetic privacy.264  The matrix of 
these features, while possibly unique as compared to other 
collections of information, will be treated as private for Fourth 
Amendment purposes depending on people’s expectations about 
                                                                                                                   
 262 MICHAEL ONDAATJE, DIVISADERO 135 (2007). 
 263 Id. at 136. 
 264 Kaye, supra note 38, at 65; see also Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic 
Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1999) 
(“Genetic information is not truly unique compared to other health information.”). 
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genetic privacy rather than on whether these features are 
exceptional or not.  
3.  Dignitary Privacy.  Dignitary privacy contemplates a 
portrait of privacy less driven by physical and informational 
images.  All conceptions of privacy in some respect contemplate an 
intrusion upon a protected core.  For some of these conceptions, 
the protected core is, primarily, something relatively concrete—a 
body, a place, an object, even information.265  In Solove’s capturing 
of the traditional expressions of the idea of privacy, these 
conceptions of privacy would include: limited access to the self, 
secrecy, and the control of personal information.266   
For other conceptions, the protected core is primarily something 
much less concrete and much more intangible—one’s identity, 
one’s sense of self, or one’s dignity.  In the language of Solove’s 
traditional expressions: the right to be let alone, to personhood, 
and to intimacy.267  These features of the protected core do not 
exist independent of the more concrete ones.  But they capture an 
aspect of that core that, at once, builds on and is different from its 
more concrete siblings. 
For example, when a home is burglarized, the homeowner has 
suffered an intrusion on several very tangible aspects of a 
protected core—the home, items that were taken, and perhaps 
information to which the burglar had access.  The homeowner also 
has suffered an intrusion on a more intangible aspect of that 
core—the sense that an unwanted person has been within a zone 
that is personal and intimate.  The second intrusion to some extent 
builds on the first because no intrusion on the intangible core 
would occur without the more concrete intrusion on home, 
property, and information.   
But more has occurred than just the concrete intrusion.  We 
sometimes hear friends or family who, referring to a burglary of 
their residence, say: “It’s not what they took, it’s the sense that 
someone was in my house” or “it’s creepy to think someone was 
here.”  It may go too far to suggest in this context that the 
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 266 Id. 
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intangible violation goes to the core of who one is or one’s dignity.  
It seems almost completely dependent on the physical intrusion.  
Part of that reluctance is because the physical intrusion itself 
looms so vivid and large in comparison to what I call the dignitary 
intrusion.  
Surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA aligns this 
calculus of privacy values differently.  Currently, courts and 
commentators view the physical intrusion as nonexistent and the 
informational intrusion as limited at least in its use.  Whether 
those judges measure that particular calculus appropriately, the 
significance of dignitary privacy is brought into higher relief in 
surreptitious harvesting cases.  Though the victim of 
governmental surreptitious harvesting feels no physical pain, the 
presence of the government “in her DNA” and the knowledge of 
that presence are intrusions on one’s dignity and self-identity.   
Recall the genetic-database cases in which judges spoke of 
“[t]he more telescopic and inchoate value of personal privacy”; of 
DNA being “immensely private”; of “privacy and dignity”; and of 
“the secret regions of man’s life.”268  To have the government 
present in one’s DNA and to have the government store one’s DNA 
without any limits on its use speaks of a limit on individual 
autonomy.  That presence and that storage, secret as it may be, 
might affect one’s conduct and self-identity.  And this effect might 
occur even though the government may never actively do anything 
with the DNA.  The dignity inherent in individual autonomy free 
of governmental interference flows from one’s inherent dignity as a 
human being—what many call a “negative liberty.”269 
The idea of dignity as a constitutional consideration is common.  
Noemi Rao has written that the concept of inherent dignity is 
present in much of the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence.  For example, as the Court has addressed issues of 
drug testing, self-representation, sexual autonomy, reproductive 
rights, and free speech, it has discerned the concept of inherent 
                                                                                                                   
 268 See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.  
 269 Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
183, 203–05 (2011).  Much of what follows draws on Rao’s analysis of the three kinds of 
dignity that constitutions protect. 
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dignity in the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.270  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the plurality said: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are 
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs 
about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the 
State.271 
The Miranda Court was also emphatic about the role of dignity 
in its analysis of the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination when it spoke of “one overriding thought: the 
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a 
government—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and 
integrity of its citizens.”272 
More specifically, the idea of dignitary privacy is central to the 
Fourth Amendment.  It is the most explicit privacy amendment to 
the Constitution and, over the years, the Court has consistently 
identified dignity as one of the interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment from a case like Schmerber (the Fourth Amendment 
protects personal privacy and dignity)273 to a case like City of 
Ontario, California v. Quon (the Fourth Amendment guarantees 
privacy, dignity, and security).274 
The idea of dignitary privacy also appears in circumstances 
involving newer technology.  Conceptually, the GPS-tracking and 
the public-video surveillance examples seem to represent practical 
                                                                                                                   
 270 Id. at 207–16. 
 271 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (emphasis added). 
 272 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (emphasis added). 
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 274 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2627 (2010). 
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circumstances that raise dignitary, as well as other, privacy 
concerns.  In the GPS cases, most commonly, the police place a 
GPS device on the outside of a suspect’s car while it is in a public 
place in order to track the travels of the car’s driver.275  The police 
do not engage in any physical intrusion, either into the suspect’s 
car or onto his property in order to access the car.  
In the public-video surveillance circumstance, the police 
position cameras in advantageous locations to film all the activity 
and people there.276  Again, in capturing people’s faces and conduct 
as they go about their daily business, the police intrude neither on 
their body nor on any physical zone of privacy. 
In both circumstances, the privacy intrusion is one that 
essentially occurs in public.  It is to a protected core that relates to 
one’s presence in the public world.  One can conceive of this core in 
a number of ways beyond simply the gathering of personal or 
intimate information: Does one have the right to be left alone, even 
in public?277  Does one have a right to anonymity even when in 
public?278  Does one have the right not to be always watched by the 
government? 
This less tangible, more dignitary sense of privacy is, at best, a 
nascent one in the GPS cases.  In State v. Jackson, a 2003 GPS 
case, the Washington Supreme Court recognized a very 
substantial informational-privacy interest against 24-hour GPS 
                                                                                                                   
 275 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (tracking suspect’s whereabouts via 
GPS constitutes search for Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Moran, 349 F. 
Supp. 2d 425, 467 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (attaching a GPS device to defendant’s vehicle did not 
constitute search or seizure); Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002) (suspect “had 
neither a subjective nor an objective expectation of privacy in the bumper of his vehicle”); 
State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003) (“[C]itizens of this State have a right to be 
free from the type of governmental intrusion that occurs when a GPS device is attached to a 
citizen’s vehicle, regardless of reduced privacy expectations due to advances in 
technology.”). 
 276 See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and 
the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 219–22 (2002) (describing the use of surveillance 
cameras in the United States); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 82–83 (2007) (same). 
 277 See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890) (describing the right to be left alone). 
 278 SLOBOGIN, supra note 276, at 79–117. 
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surveillance.279   In doing so, it also noted with approval the 
analysis of the Oregon Supreme Court in a radio-transmitter case.  
In the case, the court evaluated a kind of privacy interest on top of 
the already significant informational one it had found: 
The court reasoned that use of a device that enabled 
the police to locate a person within a 40-mile radius 
day or night “is a significant limitation on freedom 
from scrutiny” and “a staggering limitation upon 
personal freedom.”  The court noted that allowing use 
of such radio transmitters would mean that 
“individuals must more readily assume that they are 
the objects of government scrutiny” noting that 
commentators “have observed that freedom may be 
impaired as much, if not more so, by the threat of 
scrutiny as by the fact of scrutiny.”280 
Yet in United States v. Jones, a case involving surreptitious GPS 
surveillance, the Supreme Court did not explicitly describe the 
privacy interest at stake.281   And the public-video-surveillance 
cases have not yet made their way into the case law in this 
country.282 
Whatever the current level of recognition of a dignitary-privacy 
invasion in the GPS-tracking cases, the above examples show that 
the focal point of a dignitary-privacy claim is the presence of an 
“other” as the scrutinizer.  Whether the scrutiny accompanies a 
bodily invasion, (Schmerber), a cell phone (Quon), one’s 
decisionmaking (Casey), or one’s psyche (Miranda), it is the fact 
                                                                                                                   
 279 76 P.3d at 224. 
 280 Id. at 224 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1048 (Or. 
1988)).  
 281 The plurality focused narrowly on a property analysis, one that a group of four justices 
felt resolved the issue.  See 132 S. Ct. at 949–53.  Justices Sotomayor’s and Alito’s opinions 
at least explored the informational-privacy dimension of the practice.  See id. at 957 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing for right of privacy information); id. at 964 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that the public has an expectation of privacy in GPS tracking data). 
 282 Public-video-surveillance usage is much more developed in England.  See SLOBOGIN, 
supra note 276, at 83–84 (discussing the extent of surveillance in the United Kingdom). 
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that someone else is there, that one is not alone, or that the other 
is uninvited that is the essence of the violation.   
The sense of violation that accompanies the dignitary intrusion 
does not grow merely out of the other’s physical presence or the 
other’s active interference with one’s body or one’s personal 
information.  To paraphrase and extend the logic of one court, 
freedom may be impaired as much, if not more so, by the thought 
that someone has been there, is there, or may be there, whether 
they did, said, or took anything.283  Or, as Justice Sotomayor noted 
in her Jones concurrence, “[a]wareness that the Government may 
be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”284  To be 
scrutinized in and of itself offends one’s dignity whatever the use 
to which the scrutiny is put. 
The nature of a Fourth Amendment dignitary-privacy invasion 
requires that a governmental authority engage in the scrutiny.  
The idea that the government in some capacity is present in one’s 
decisionmaking, one’s cell-phone conversations, one’s psyche, or 
one’s daily whereabouts accentuates the harm to one’s dignity.285 
Anthony Amsterdam directly addressed the fundamental issue 
in his 1974 piece on Katz and the Fourth Amendment: 
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment.  It 
is whether, if the particular form of surveillance 
practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated 
by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and 
freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to 
a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and 
open society.  That, in outright terms, is the judgment 
lurking underneath the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Katz, and it seems to me the judgment that the fourth 
amendment inexorably requires the Court to make.286 
                                                                                                                   
 283 Campbell, 759 P.2d at 1048. 
 284 132 S. Ct. at 956. 
 285 Decisionmaking and psyche invasions like those in Casey and Miranda occur under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Nonetheless, the specter of the governmental presence 
is the same. 
 286 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
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What offends one’s dignity is that scrutiny of DNA offers up the 
kaleidoscope of identity to those with access.  The dignitary 
intrusion is not what the government will or may do with such 
access.  It is that the government gets to look into the kaleidoscope 
in all its layered, temporal, and spatial richness.  The mere 
presence of the government at that window on core identity is the 
dignitary intrusion287 and it compounds the physical and 
informational intrusion. 
By contrast, the dignitary intrusion associated with 
fingerprinting is less significant.  Fingerprints too represent a 
color in the identity spectrum.  Like DNA, fingerprints are in code 
and are available in public.  Unlike DNA, they are less biologically 
locked, and the quality of their identifying information is relatively 
one-dimensional in contrast to DNA’s kaleidoscope of identity.  
Superficial by nature, fingerprints do not give rise to a sense that 
they provide a window on core identity.  Thus, while a mild 
dignitary invasion may exist when the government possesses 
fingerprints, it is different in kind from that associated with 
DNA.288 
*** 
Any assessment of the expectation of privacy that people have 
in DNA will be an approximation that inevitably includes a 
measure of subjective judgment.  This is because the concept of 
harming one’s dignity implies a level of definitional certainty and 
objectivity that is anything but the case.  Dignity is, by its nature, 
a very subjective concept—one person’s dignity may be another’s 
prickliness.  Historically, it has been very much a moving target, 
particularly as a legal concept.289  Including an assessment of the 
                                                                                                                   
403 (1974). 
 287 This dignitary intrusion is exacerbated because some police departments have begun 
compiling DNA databases of samples collected in circumstances outside those covered by 
the regulatory structures of state and federal law.  For example, the New York City medical 
examiner’s office purportedly has a “linkage” or “rogue” database that includes former 
suspects, arrestees, and others never convicted of a crime.  See Richard Willing, Authorities 
Find More Uses for DNA Databases, USA TODAY, Mar. 26, 2007, http://usatoday30.usatod 
ay.com/news/nation/2007-03-25-dna-databases-inside_n.htm (discussing content and use of 
rogue databases).   
 288 See infra Part VI. 
 289 Neomi Rao captures this slipperiness well: 
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extent of dignitary harm in measuring one’s expectation of privacy 
risks reducing the assessment to merely one individual’s 
judgment. 
The Katz test accounts for this concern.  It requires a subjective 
expectation of privacy and an expectation of privacy that society is 
willing to recognize as reasonable.290  The objective focus of the 
second prong moderates the risk of the test offering Fourth 
Amendment protection to over personalized, idiosyncratic senses of 
privacy.  The challenge then is to lend at least some empirical 
meaning to the genetic privacy that “society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable,”291 to do so in a way that transcends the 
idiosyncratic, the personal and the anecdotal, and to avoid mere 
theorizing. 
VI.  “SOCIETY IS WILLING TO RECOGNIZE AS REASONABLE . . .”—A 
SOCIETAL PERSPECTIVE ON GENETIC PRIVACY 
Post-Katz, the Supreme Court has periodically referred to a 
desire to look for the legitimation of the expectations of privacy to 
be protected outside the Fourth Amendment itself.  In Rakas v. 
Illinois, the Court expressed an interest in external legal concepts, 
like property law and in “understandings that are recognized and 
permitted by society”292 as such sources, and that idea has 
continued to appear in the Court’s jurisprudence.293   
                                                                                                                   
 As a fundamental precept of human rights and basic liberties, dignity 
really took hold after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated: 
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”  But even 
in the Universal Declaration, the start of international efforts to protect 
human dignity, the drafters disagreed about the meaning of human dignity. 
 Today, widespread adoption of dignity in modern constitutions and 
human rights documents has not led to any greater consensus—rather 
different conceptions of dignity remain.  The fact that “dignity” is an 
important yet slippery concept has become commonplace. 
Rao, supra note 269, at 185–86 (footnotes omitted). 
 290 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 291 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 292 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978); see also Christopher Slobogin & Joseph 
E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment 
Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 
DUKE L.J. 727, 731 (1993) (“Although this language appeared in a footnote, and was 
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Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher have made the 
most direct effort to capture empirically the public’s understanding 
of a variety of Fourth Amendment privacy interests.  In a 1993 
study, Slobogin and Schumacher surveyed over 200 people “to 
ascertain their understanding of the interests implicated by 
various types of police investigative techniques.”294  
From the survey, they developed the preliminary hypothesis 
that court decisions about where expectations of privacy lie do not 
necessarily reflect societal understandings and, in fact, “tend to 
underestimate the privacy and autonomy interests infringed on by 
police actions.”295 Unfortunately, Slobogin and Schumacher 
conducted their survey at a time when the police were not using 
either genetic databases or surreptitious DNA harvesting.  Others 
have not extended this empirical approach to those kinds of police 
investigative efforts. 
Some polling however exists on the general idea of genetic 
privacy, particularly as to genetic information and genetic 
discrimination.296  One such study surveyed 1,199 individuals 
about their level of trust in doctors, spouses, researchers, law 
enforcement, health insurers, and employers with access to test 
results for genetic disorders.297  At the extremes, 86% had some or 
a lot of trust in their doctors, and only 16% had some or a lot of 
trust in their employers.298  Law enforcement fell in the low middle 
with 46% expressing some or a lot of trust and 54% expressing 
only a little or no trust.299 
                                                                                                                   
directed solely toward defining the standing concept, it has since been relied upon in the 
text of several other cases involving the ‘search’ issue, often rephrased in terms of 
expectations of privacy ‘society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’ ”). 
 293 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 292, at 731–32. 
 294 Id. at 732. 
 295 Id. 
 296 See, e.g., Kira A. Apse et al., Perceptions of Genetic Discrimination Among At-Risk 
Relatives of Colorectal Cancer Patients, 6 GENETICS IN MED. 510, 511 (2004) (studying 
people’s fears over genetic discrimination). 
 297 GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., U.S. PUBLIC OPINION ON USES OF GENETIC 
INFORMATION AND GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 1–2 (2007), available at http://www.dnapolicy. 
org/policy.polls.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
 298 Id. at 2. 
 299 Id. 
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Absent direct survey results on surreptitious DNA harvesting 
or on the privacy concerns stemming from police possession of 
genetic information, a look at the use of DNA images in public 
culture helps to reveal fundamental attitudes about DNA.  
Genetics and DNA have been a focus of public culture for a long 
time.  Karen Rothenberg has written about the space that genetics 
has occupied in the public imagination as revealed by drama 
during the eugenic era of the early twentieth century and during 
the “new genetics” era since 1990.300  The 1997 science-fiction film, 
Gattaca, portrays an acutely dystopic vision of a future society in 
which the predictive value of genetic information organizes society 
into the gene elite and the “de-gene-erates.”301  Privacy is 
nonexistent in a society in which one’s DNA determined all.302 
Beyond film and literature, a look at public discourse, especially 
the use of DNA metaphors, through the prism of language theory 
suggests that public attitudes towards DNA and its relationship 
with core identity is deeply embedded in our culture.  Language 
theorists tell us that in using a metaphor to describe something, 
we are trying to bring a better understanding of that “something” 
to the audience by referencing a reference point that we already 
know and understand.303   By doing so, we lend conception of the 
reference point to our conception of the less known thing, thereby 
bringing in more definition.304 
                                                                                                                   
 300 See generally Karen H. Rothenberg, From Eugenics to the “New” Genetics: “The Play’s 
the Thing,” 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (2010) (concluding that the ethical, legal, and social 
implications of genetics have captured and will continue to capture the imagination of both 
science and theatre). 
 301 GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997); see also David A. Kirby, The Devil in Our DNA: A 
Brief History of Eugenics in Science Fiction Films, 26 LITERATURE & MED. J. 83, 103–06 
(2007) (“GATTACA depicts many of the ethical issues associated with the new eugenics, 
such as genetic discrimination, genetic prophecy, and the homogenization of society.”). 
 302 Cf. Kirby, supra note 301, at 104 (explaining the film’s depiction of human beings’ 
value relative to the value of their cast-off DNA). 
 303 What follows is based on the important work of language theorists like George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson and captured in their classic book, GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, 
METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).  
 304 Lina Hellsten has described the process as applied to the metaphor “horsepower” as 
follows: 
[A] metaphor consists of two or more separate issues, the source domain 
(e.g., horses) and the target domain (e.g., car engines), and a set of elements 
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For instance, Lakoff and Johnson offer two examples of 
ontological metaphors for the mind.  Statements like:  
“We’re still trying to grind out the solution to this 
equation”  
“My mind isn’t operating today”   
“Boy, the wheels are turning now!”  
“I’m a little rusty today”305  
contain metaphors that capture the idea of the “Mind as a 
Machine” and bring another layer of understanding to the way the 
mind works.306 
Statements like:  
“Her ego is very fragile”  
“You have to handle him with care since his wife’s 
death”  
“He broke under cross-examination”  
“She is easily crushed”307 
contain metaphors that capture the idea of “The Mind is a Brittle 
Object.”308  Both metaphorical images present conceptual models 
for understanding a less-than-fully-understood thing—the mind.  
Both lend a different layer of understanding to the mind.  As 
Lakoff and Johnson describe: 
The MACHINE metaphor gives us a conception of the 
mind as having an on-off state, a level of efficiency, a 
productive capacity, an internal mechanism, a source 
                                                                                                                   
that are mapped across the source and the target domains (e.g., function as 
a source of power for a vehicle).  The purpose of metaphorical mapping, at a 
general level, is to approach new issues in terms of something that is 
already familiar to the user(s) of that metaphor. 
Lina Hellsten, Popular Metaphors of Biosciences: Bridges over Time?, 16 CONFIGURATIONS 
11, 14 (2009) (footnote omitted). 
 305 Id. at 27. 
 306 Id at 27–28. 
 307 Id. at 28. 
 308 Id. 
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of energy, and an operating condition.  The BRITTLE 
OBJECT metaphor is not nearly as rich.  It allows us to 
talk only about psychological strength.  However, there 
is a range of mental experience that can be conceived 
of in terms of either metaphor.309 
Note that the accuracy of the metaphor is not the issue—the 
question is not whether the mind actually works as a machine or is 
a brittle object at the neuro-psychological level.  Rather, the 
metaphors we choose to explain the mind tell us about how we 
order our world—the metaphors we live by.   
Additionally, the use of metaphors helps us bring some 
boundaries to things that otherwise seem boundary-less.  The 
expression “Harry is in love” conceptualizes love as a kind of 
location or container, bringing more definition to the concept of 
love.310  It grounds the less clearly delineated in the more clearly 
delineated.311 
Several scholars have examined the different metaphors and 
imagery used to describe genetics and DNA as a means of 
explaining and understanding society’s attitudes.  Celeste Condit 
has explored the metaphors and rhetoric about “the gene” in the 
public discourse over the course of the twentieth century.  In 
particular, she tracked the changes in metaphors used to “explain” 
human heredity from the eugenics era to the end of the twentieth 
century.312  José Van Dijck has explored the role of images in the 
popular representations of the new genetics since the 1950s.313  
She evaluated how different and conflicting popular 
representations of genetics over time reflected the interplay 
                                                                                                                   
 309 Id.  
 310 Id. at 58–59. 
 311 Id. at 59.   
 312 See generally CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, THE MEANINGS OF THE GENE: PUBLIC 
DEBATES ABOUT HUMAN HEREDITY (David J. De Pew et al. eds., 1999) (describing a 
sequence of metaphors over time used to describe human heredity: a breeding-stock 
metaphor; the idea of the gene controling of humans; the code metaphor; and the blueprint 
metaphor). 
 313 JOSÉ VAN DIJCK, IMAGENATION: POPULAR IMAGES OF GENETICS (1998) (describing how 
different groups have described genetics in metaphors and how those metaphors changed 
over time). 
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between these images and the meaning lent by society to 
developments in genetics. 
Both Condit and Van Dijck focused on what images or 
metaphors people used to explain DNA or the gene.  They were 
able to gain a new understanding about how society thought about 
the unfamiliar—genetics—by virtue of the familiar images they 
used to explain it—breeding, stock, code, blueprint etc. In the 
language of Hellsten, the source domain—the blueprint—helps 
explain the target domain—DNA—by bringing the elements of a 
blueprint to one’s efforts to understand DNA. 
Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee began to flip this dynamic 
around.  In The DNA Mystique: The Gene as a Cultural Icon, they 
explored how popular culture used images of the gene and DNA to 
see what those images told us about societal attitudes towards the 
gene.314   They found that the gene was treated as “a cultural icon, 
a symbol, almost a magical force” in popular culture.315  In 
particular, they concluded that “the images and narratives of the 
gene in popular culture reflect and convey a message we will call 
genetic essentialism.”316  That message reduces humans with all 
their “social, historical, and moral complexity” to a molecular 
entity, the gene.317  
If one flips the dynamic used by Condit and Van Dijck around 
completely, one would look at how popular culture uses the DNA 
metaphor to understand the culture’s attitude toward DNA.  
Instead of treating DNA as the thing in need of more 
understanding or grounding, one would use DNA as the source 
domain or reference point and any variety of less familiar or less 
grounded things as target domains.  The use of DNA as a 
referential metaphor would then reflect how society thought of 
DNA itself.   
                                                                                                                   
 314 DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A CULTURAL 
ICON (2004). 
 315 Id. at 2. 
 316 Id.  
 317 Id.  Nelkin and Lindee looked at a wide expanse of images, for example, the visual, the 
artistic, and the oral, and not just those that were metaphors.  As such, their classic study 
is only so useful in discerning societal attitudes towards the kaleidoscope of identity 
described above. 
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I examined how the term “DNA” was used over a one-year 
period in the New York Times and USA Today.318  This study 
begins to inform us about societal attitudes toward DNA.  In both 
newspapers, the significant majority of its uses were as a scientific 
term referencing genetic research or forensics rather than as a 
metaphor.  The New York Times had 267 mentions of DNA over 
the course of the year and 73.8% of them were scientific references, 
not metaphorical ones.  In USA Today, 63.9% of the 180 references 
were scientific.  Nonetheless, just about one-quarter of the Times 
references and over one-third of the USA Today references were 
metaphorical. 319   
The articles in which DNA was used metaphorically were 
primarily of three sorts: sports, business, and the arts.  In USA 
Today, the metaphorical use of DNA occurred most frequently in 
sports articles, followed closely by business articles, and then, to a 
lesser extent, in articles on the arts, including television.320  In the 
New York Times, the use of DNA occurred most frequently in 
business articles, then arts articles, and to a lesser extent in sports 
articles.321 
Whatever the subject of the articles, the thing sought to be 
better understood or grounded—the target domain—was almost 
always behavior of some kind.322   In articles about business, it was 
                                                                                                                   
 318 I recorded every mention of DNA over a one-year period in both newspapers.  The 
papers were selected because both have a national circulation and arguably different, 
though probably overlapping, readerships.  Though the term was used by journalists, the 
premise underlying this study is that journalists would use the kinds of metaphors that 
would be within their audience’s comprehension to explain something that is less 
understood or grounded.  In other words, journalists would likely not use a quantum-
physics metaphor to explain anything other than impenetrable complexity. 
 319 Out of 267 references in the New York Times, 197 were scientific and 70 were 
metaphorical.  In USA Today, 115 references were scientific and 65 were metaphorical. 
 320 Of the 65 references in USA Today, DNA was used metaphorically 22 times in sports 
articles, 18 times in business/marketing articles, and 10 times in arts articles.  There was 
lesser use in political articles (5), book reviews (3), and personal articles (2). 
 321 Of the 70 metaphorical uses of DNA in the New York Times, 20 occurred in 
business/marketing articles, 19 occurred in arts articles, and 9 uses occurred in sports 
articles. 
 322 Over 90% of the metaphorical uses of DNA in USA Today and the New York Times 
involved behavior of some sort as the target domain. 
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the behavior of a company;323 in articles about music or the arts, it 
was the behavior of a band,324 an artist,325 or an author; and in 
articles about sports, it was an individual’s326 or a team’s327 
behavior.  More specifically, the use of a DNA metaphor virtually 
always sought to explain an aspect of identity.  Sometimes, the 
reference was direct—he acted this way because it is who he is: 
 “He is the epitome of what the Heat is about,” team 
president Pat Riley said.  “He is our anchor, he is a 
true warrior and a great professional.” 
 That’s why Wade reached out to Haslem constantly 
during the free-agent process, if only to remind him 
that was the case. 
 “I would be changing my DNA if I left just for 
money,” Haslem said.328 
Or: 
Pie-making is in the DNA of Melissa . . . and Emily 
Elsen.  Their grandmother baked pies for their 
                                                                                                                   
 323 E.g., Nick Bunkley, Dutch Car Maker Still Pushing to Buy Saab, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/business/global/13saab.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y 
(questioning Saab’s DNA). 
 324 E.g., Jon Caramanica, Dapper, Privileged and Unapologetic, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/arts/music/16vampire.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y (traces 
of ska in Vampire Weekend’s DNA). 
 325 E.g., Stephen Holden, Three Loners on a Road Leading to One Another, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/26/movies/26yellow.html?emc=tnt&tntemail 
0=y (character not in actor’s DNA). 
 326 E.g., Peyton Manning Not Looking for Drastic Solutions to End Slump, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 8, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/colts/2010-12-08-peyton-slump_N. 
htm (Peyton’s preparation in his DNA). 
 327 E.g., Mike Dodd, Why Can’t Cubs Win? Quirks at Wrigley Field Among Theories, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 20, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/nl/cubs/2010-08-17-basebal 
l-chicago-cubs-lou-piniella-wrigley-field-_N.htm (Cubs’ championship-prohibiting DNA). 
 328 Haslem Staying with Miami; Mike Miller Expected To Join as Well, USA TODAY, July 
13, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/heat/2010-07-12-udonis-haslem-co 
ntract_N.htm. 
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mother’s restaurant in Hecla, S.D., and it was from her 
that they learned their craft.329 
Sometimes, the DNA metaphor explains why a particular group 
acted the way it did:  
 Because the festival, which runs through May 2, was 
born in the ashes of the World Trade Center as a 
community development project to revive the 
devastated economy of Lower Manhattan, you might 
say “My Trip to Al-Qaeda” is woven into [the Tribeca 
Film Festival’s] DNA.330   
Other times, the reference was to accumulated behavior and 
offered to identify who someone or some group is: 
 “Value is an intrinsic part of the DNA of 
Nymphenburg [the porcelain manufactory of the 
Bavarian crown],” he said. “We are a raw diamond, an 
independent company with a social responsibility to 
the place and the people.”331 
Or: 
At first, Disney had high hopes for the characters, 
exploring additional licensing and even a feature film.  
But focus group research soured Disney on them.  
Mothers, the research showed, disliked the violence—
particularly the hand-to-hand combat—that is part of 
the franchise’s DNA.332 
                                                                                                                   
 329 Florence Fabricant, Sisters Open a Pie Shop in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/dining/21pies.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y. 
 330 Stephen Holden, 12 Days, 132 Films, 38 Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/movies/16tribeca.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y. 
 331 Suzy Menkes, Nymphenburg Porcelain Gets a Fresh New Look, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/fashion/27iht-fnymph.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y. 
 332 Brian Stelter & Brooks Barnes, Disney Sells a Franchise That Mothers Didn’t Like, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/business/media/13saban.htm 
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And, occasionally, the DNA metaphor was a broad-stroke 
statement of identity: 
 That might have been the end of the story, except 
that this is South Africa, the country that ended a 
vicious system of racial segregation 16 years ago to 
create a noisy, fractious, vibrant democracy.  Poking a 
finger in the eye of authority is part of the national 
DNA.333 
As is apparent from the above, often DNA is being used 
metaphorically to capture a core aspect of identity, not simply a 
transitory or passing feature.  Lakoff and Johnson call such 
aspects of metaphorical use “entailments,” which bring even more 
depth to the metaphorical reference.334   
 
The entailments that come with the use of the DNA metaphor 
to capture aspects of identity involve: 
 
Permanence: 
 “That’s who I am,” he said.  “I can’t be afraid to 
express myself.  I have to be me.” 
 Manuel almost seems to draw a spiritual lift from 
his deep, staccato laugh, which usually follows one of 
his humorous remarks.  The jokes, witticisms and wry 
comments are part of his DNA, and they are not going 
away because of games that are lost.335 
                                                                                                                   
l?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y. 
 333 Celia W. Dugger, South Africa Pushes To Make the Cup Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/24/sports/soccer/24safrica.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y. 
 334 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 139.  Lakoff and Johnson use the example of 
the metaphor, LOVE IS A COLLABORATIVE WORK OF ART to illustrate common 
entailments like, “Love is work.  Love is active.  Love requires cooperation.  Love requires 
dedication . . . Love involves shared responsibility . . . Love demands sacrifice . . .” etc.  Id. 
at 140. 
 335 David Waldstein, Manuel Under Pressure, but Hardly Showing It, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/24/sports/baseball/24mets.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y. 




 The years clicked by.  Boys became men.  All but one 
went off to fight World War II.  One didn’t come back. 
Careers replaced carousing.  Still, they remained 
friends, a lifelong affection for one another somehow 
inscribed in their DNA. Every so often, they 
demonstrated their unflinching fidelity by gathering 
for a reunion dinner.336 
Inevitability or fatalism: 
 Morris agrees.  “[A] huge problem is that the 
irresponsibility of those large company CEOs has 
painted a negative portrayal of ALL business . . .” 
 “[W]e WILL end up paying for the free lunch we've 
been enjoying. Capitalism/entrepreneurship is in the 
human DNA. Drift is temporary,” tweeted Larry 
Strassner, CEO of Russell & Mackenna, which makes 
cottage-style furniture.337 
Intimacy or at one’s core: 
 Nor is there anything new about complaints that BP 
is secretive in its operations and given to doubletalk in 
responding to valid criticisms in host countries.  This 
is certainly not the whole story, but these very British 
negatives are deeply embedded in its corporate 
DNA.338  
Or, most ironically: 
                                                                                                                   
 336 N.R. Kleinfeld, Together More Than 70 Years, Friends Reunite, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/nyregion/09friends.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y. 
 337 Del Jones, CEOs Tweet in News Story Reported Completely on Twitter, USA TODAY, 
May 28, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2009-05-27-ceos-tw 
itter-reporting-capitalism_N.htm. 
 338 Karl E. Meyer & Shareen Blair Brysac, How British (Really) is BP?, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/opinion/17iht-edmeyer.html?emc=tnt&tntemail0=y. 
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 Q: How much of my privacy am I giving up? 
 A: You’re giving up none of your privacy. Our 
business is about consumer first, advertiser second, 
and AdKeeper third. 
 Services like Facebook and Google have done a 
disservice to the industry because they don’t think that 
privacy is in their DNA.  At Facebook their DNA is to 
share.  We will never give your personal data to an 
advertiser. Advertisers would like to have that. But 
we’re not giving it to them.339 
The depth and breadth of the core-identity imagery associated 
with the DNA metaphor in these examples of public discourse is 
unmistakable.  The ubiquity goes beyond the New York Times and 
USA Today.  In a debate on the U.S. Senate floor on the quality of 
President Obama’s judicial nominees, Senator Jeff Sessions said, 
“I’m sure that less than one percent of the lawyers in America are 
members of the ACLU. . . .  It seems if you have the ACLU DNA, 
you get a pretty good leg up to being nominated by this 
president.”340  
In his biography of the late Steve Jobs, Walter Isaacson quoted 
a one-time Jobs girlfriend commenting about Jobs and Daniel 
Kottke, “Daniel didn’t have that DNA of ruthlessness, so he was a 
bit flipped by Steve’s behavior.”341  Later, Isaacson quotes Jobs as 
saying, “It’s in Apple’s DNA that technology alone is not enough.  
We believe that it’s technology married with the humanities that 
yields us the result that makes our heart sing.”342 
In the language of Lakoff and Johnson, these entailments—
permanence, immutability, inevitability, intimacy—reverberate 
                                                                                                                   
 339 David Lieberman, Advertisers Betting That AdKepper’s a Web Business Keeper, USA 
TODAY, Nov. 3, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/technologylive/post/2010/11/ 
advertisers-betting-that-adkeepers-a-web-business-keeper/1. 
 340 Ryan J. Reilly, Jeff Sessions Rants Against Judicial Nominees with ‘ACLA DNA’ 
(VIDEO), TPM.COM, Dec. 21, 2010, http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/12/ 
jeff_sessions_rants_against_judicial_nominees_with_aclu_dna_video.php. 
 341 WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 89 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 342 Id. at 527. 
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within the core-identity DNA metaphor.343  They bring deeper 
meaning to society’s understanding of behavior and identity.  More 
to the point here, the richness of the features captured by the DNA 
metaphor tells us more about what society thinks about DNA.   
That DNA is about core identity for those who use DNA 
metaphors to explain behavior and identity reinforces the sense 
that society views DNA as involving core identity.  The use of DNA 
metaphors by writers, reviewers, journalists, and senators to help 
their audiences understand behavior and identity presumes that 
the core-identity DNA metaphor is a familiar one shared by their 
audiences.   
It also suggests that society’s sense of the role of DNA in 
defining part of one’s identity is much more profound than its 
sense of the role of fingerprints.  An examination of the use of a 
fingerprint as a metaphor in USA Today and the New York Times 
reinforces this distinction.  Over approximately six-months, 86.4% 
of the uses of the word “fingerprint” in USA Today were scientific 
or forensic and 13.6% were metaphorical.  In the New York Times, 
79.6% were scientific or forensic and 20.4% were metaphorical.344   
As with DNA metaphors, the fingerprint metaphors were 
always metaphors about identity.  Whatever the metaphor was 
lending more meaning or grounding to, it did so by capturing an 
aspect of identity represented by a fingerprint.  For example: 
 The neighborhood itself is a spur to creativity, she 
said. 
 “The really amazing thing about that area is one 
building will be a stage, but if you look into the next 
little warehouse, somebody’s packing tomatoes, and if 
you look into the one beyond, somebody’s making 
glass,” Ms. Dokoza said. “It’s a very unusual 
neighborhood, with the Polish bakeries—like a 
fingerprint of yesteryear.”345  
                                                                                                                   
 343 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 303, at 140. 
 344 There were 98 uses in the New York Times and 59 uses in USA Today. 
 345 Alison Gregor, Lights, Camera, Pierogi: Movies in Greenpoint, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, 
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The aspect of identity captured by the fingerprint metaphors 
differed from that captured by the DNA metaphor.  The DNA 
metaphor captured core-identity aspects: permanence, 
immutability, fatalism, etc.  The fingerprint metaphor captured 
only more superficial aspects of identity—trace, brand, 
identification tag, and signature.  For example: 
 Some of the answers will become clearer with 
further analysis of the radiation in the water, Sich 
said, noting that the presence of certain isotopes could 
help determine whether the contamination came from 
the reactor core or a spent fuel pool. 
 “We need to see the chemical analysis of the water,” 
he said.  “That’s the fingerprint.”346 
The contrast between the metaphorical uses of DNA and 
fingerprints in the public discourse mirrors the distinctions drawn 
between the two in the discussion above about genetic privacy.347  
DNA contains a multi-dimensional kaleidoscope of identity, and a 
fingerprint operates as a one-dimensional trace of physical 
presence.   The manifestations of societal attitudes revealed in the 
uses of such metaphors confirm the relative weightiness and 
richness of attitudes towards DNA. 
These attitudes do not directly address the critical Katz 
inquiry—whether society is willing to recognize an expectation of 
privacy in DNA as reasonable.  However, if society’s attitudes 
concerning DNA reflect a sense that it is about core-identity, it 
strongly suggests that society would accept as reasonable that one 
expects privacy in that identity.  
                                                                                                                   
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/realestate/commercial/21greenpoint.html?scp=100&sq=fin
gerprint&st=nyt. 
 346 Radiation Spreading to Seawater, Soil in Japan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 28, 2011, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-27-japan-nuclear_N.htm. 
 347 See supra Part V. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Unregulated surreptitious DNA harvesting is at the 
intersection of modern technology and the Fourth Amendment.  It 
is a creative crime-solving tool that capitalizes on advances in 
modern genetic research and forensic science.  It follows on the 
heels of more frequent applications of forensic DNA technology 
that use suspect samples obtained via search warrants and genetic 
databases.  It is at the forefront of genetic investigation creativity 
with familial searching and the indictment of genetic profiles in 
the absence of a known suspect. 
The early courts that evaluated the constitutionality of DNA 
harvesting have not been as creative.  Using a Fourth Amendment 
analytical model focused narrowly on property-oriented privacy, 
those courts have mishandled the analysis.  They have relied on a 
superficial abandonment approach that not only allows the police 
to engage in the practice without any prior justification but also 
effectively allows the police to use the harvested DNA for any 
purpose at any time. 
A rigorous application of the traditional Katz test for Fourth 
Amendment searches produces a different focus.  Such an analysis 
asks whether an individual has abandoned the expectation of 
privacy in the DNA within the nucleus of a cell that is found on an 
abandoned item, not whether one has abandoned the DNA.   
The result of that analysis is quite different from that of the 
early DNA harvesting courts.  The physical, informational, and 
dignitary dimensions of genetic privacy produce an expectation of 
privacy in the kaleidoscope of identity that is DNA.  And that 
expectation of privacy is one that society more than likely is 
willing to recognize as reasonable.  Popular culture uses DNA 
metaphors as a reference point to explain a number of features of 
core identity—permanence, immutability, inevitability, and 
intimacy.  Popular culture’s frequent uses of DNA as a reference 
point for core-identity reverberate in a way that suggests that 
society does recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in 
DNA. 
526 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 47:445 
 
 
If so, then the police conduct a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes when they enter a cell, its nucleus, and the DNA therein 
to get identity information.  They do not need a search warrant or 
probable cause to seize the abandoned item in or on which the cells 
and DNA exist.  But they do need a search warrant supported by 
probable cause to enter the cell to harvest and sample the DNA.348 
This rule is consistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
It acknowledges the changes in expectation of privacy of 
identifying information that has come with the rapid advances in 
genetic research and technology.  It places an appropriate and 
well-measured hurdle between the police and the individual. 
                                                                                                                   
 348  This requirement, as yet unsupported by case law, is partially supported by the 
Standard 16-2.2(b) of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for DNA Evidence: 
(b) Except in exigent circumstances, a judicial order for collecting a DNA 
sample from the body of a person should be issued only upon notice and 
after an opportunity for a hearing at which the person has a right to 
counsel, including the right to appointed counsel if the person is indigent. 
(i) If the person from whom the sample is to be collected is suspected of 
committing a crime, an order should issue only upon an application 
demonstrating: 
(A) probable cause that a serious crime has been committed, and 
(B) if the sample is to be collected from a person is: 
 (1) a sample collected by a physically noninvasive means, 
reasonable suspicion that the person committed the crime 
charged. 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DNA EVIDENCE § 16-2.2(b) (2006). 
